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ABSTRACT 
The coconut industry occupies an important position in the economy 
of Sri Lanka. In addition to being a staple food item, it is the biggest 
land user, the third highest foreign exchange earner and an important 
source of government tax revenue. Since independence the government has 
intervened substantially in the industry, through price subsidies 
and trade policies such as export bans, restrictions and duties. The 
apparent objectives of government intervention have been to boost coconut 
production and productivity, protect domestic consumers, reduce price risk 
in production and collect government revenue. The purpose of the present 
study is to analyse the economic effects of these intervention policies 
and to evaluate alternative policies which may have more efficiently achieved 
the apparent objectives of the government. The analysis is preceded by a 
description of the Sri Lankan coconut industry and of the policies that 
have directly affected the industry since independence in 1948. 
The pure theory of trade demonstrates conclusively that, under 
certain assumptions, any type of interference in the free-flow of goods 
and services tends to reduce potential economic welfare. However, the 
apparent opportunities available for Sri Lanka to improve its terms of 
trade in desiccated coconut and edible copra through restricting exports 
justify some government taxation of the export of these products. Indeed 
if raising revenue for and providing consumer subsidies is sufficiently 
expensive administratively, it may well be that one could justify economically 
export duties beyond what would be the optimal tax level if government 
V 
revenue could be raised costlessly. This is because such duties not 
only assist domestic consumers but also raise government revenue. There 
may also be some economic justification for expanding extension service 
and public sector investment on coconut research, especially to suit the 
needs of small farmers, so as to boost coconut production and productivity, 
In addition, to reduce the risk of export prices falling at times to very 
low levels, 'pot holing' assistance rather than a price stabilization 
scheme may be the most efficient instrument. A more precise policy 
analysis would be desirable, but will only be possible once more 
comprehensive industry data are collected. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 General Background 
Coconut and processed coconut products belong to a major group 
of primary commodities produced in Sri Lanka and are of immense importance 
in the economy in terms of land utilization, government revenue, export 
earnings as well as being a staple food item. The centuries-old 
subsistence characteristics of coconut production were transformed to 
suit plantation agriculture in the 19th century under the British 
administration, which resulted in medium size mixed plantations and large 
scale plantations in addition to the subsistence home gardens. It also 
led to the production of processed export products such as copra, 
desiccated coconuts (d.c.), oil, fibre and charcoal products. 
Although coconuts and coconut products contribution to G.N.P. 
is about 5%, they represent between 10—15% of export earnings. In the 
world coconut economy Sri Lanka holds a less important position in terms 
of both area under cultivation (7% of world acreage) and exports of 
coconuts, industrial copra and oil (.01,2 and 12 per cent of world 
exports respectively), but in terms of international d.c. and edible copra, 
Sri Lanka is a major supplier, contributing about 40 and 95 per cent to 
world trade respectively. 
Coconut production during the last three decades has averaged 
2,365 million nuts per annum, of which about 55 per cent is domestically 
consumed directly in the form of food nuts. The balance is utilized by 
the copra and d.c. processing industries, absorbing about 32 and 13 
per cent of the crop respectively. A major portion of the copra 
produced is further processed to extract oil, and nearly half the oil 
produced is consumed domestically in the form of cooking oil and as 
industrial inputs. All d.c. production, nearly half the oil, and about 
1-2 per cent of the copra produced is exported, so that overall exports 
account for about a third of the total coconut crop in any marketing 
year. 
During the last two decades the per capita domestic consumption 
of food nuts and oil has apparently remained at around 125 nuts per 
annum and as a result of the slow rate of growth in coconut production 
relative to population, the exportable surplus has contracted over the 
years. 
Due to its importance in the economy, the coconut industry is 
administered by a separate Ministry of Coconut Industry (MCI) through 
f\inctional Boards established under the apex of a central authority within the 
MCI, namely the Coconut Development Authority (CDA). The MCI is concerned 
with the welfare of both producers and domestic consumers of coconuts 
and derivative products. In financing the coconut development programmes 
and this institutional framework, the government has relied on revenue 
collected from export duties and other forms of taxes levied on coconuts 
and processed coconut product exports. In practice, this tax revenue 
has been more than sufficient for this purpose and so it contributes a 
net surplus to government revenue. 
1.2 Objectives of the Study 
The need to expand production, the protection of domestic 
consumers, the collection of government revenue, and risk reduction, have 
been the main objectives of government policies directly affecting the 
coconut industry. Export duties and any other forms of product 
taxation are disincentives to production. The protection of consumers 
has also discriminated against producers. The development programmes 
in general attempt to increase production through various types of 
incentives. 
The pure theory of trade demonstrates conclusively that, under 
certain assumptions, free trade maximizes national and global welfare. 
Thus any type of interference in the free flow of goods and services 
tends to reduce potential economic welfare. If the government nonetheless 
wishes to intervene in markets in the pursuit of objectives other than 
maximizing potential economic welfare, economists have a role to play in 
pointing out the most efficient instrument to pursue each objective and 
the cost of diverting the economy away from its income-maximizing course. 
This study attempts to analyse the economic effects of current 
policies affecting the coconut sector of the Sri Lankan economy, and to 
evaluate alternative policies which achieve more efficiently the stated 
objectives. 
1.3 Period Under Study 
In 1948 Sri Lanka became an independant country after centuries 
of foreign rule. The transfer of power from foreigners to natives was 
followed by significant changes in all spheres, including economic policy. 
This study embraces the major policies adopted in the coconut industry 
since independence and up to the end of 1978. 
1.4 Organisation of Subsequent Chapters 
Chapter 2 provides an overview of the Sri Lankan coconut industry, 
covering its importance to the national economy and to the world coconut 
industry. It discusses aspects of the production, processing and 
marketing stages of the industry, its institutional framework, and 
government policies affecting the industry. In Chapter 3 a simple 
economic model for estimating the supply responsiveness of aggregate 
output, marketed surplus, and demand and supply elasticities is outlined. 
Economic theory and previous economic studies of the commodity enable 
the formulation of a priori expectations of the signs and magnitudes 
of the relevant parameters. Chapter 3 concludes with a discussion of 
the poor quality and quantity of data available for empirical estimation 
and an unsuccessful attempt at such estimation. In Chapter 4, the 
efficiency, distributional and welfare effects of past and present 
government policies affecting the coconut industry are analysed within 
a partial equilibrium framework, on the basis of a priori parameter 
expectations in the absence of reliable empirical estimates. This is 
followed in Chapter 5 with an analysis of alternative policy instruments 
which could achieve more efficiently the apparent objectives of government 
policies for the industry. The study concludes with Chapter 6 presenting 
a summary of the findings and a discussion of areas for further research. 
CHAPTER 2 
AN OVERVIEW OF THE COCONUT INDUSTRY IN SRI LANKA 
In this chapter the importance of the Sri Lankan coconut industry 
to the national economy and to the world coconut industry is discussed, 
following which the production, processing and marketing stages of the 
industry and its institutional framework are outlined. The chapter 
concludes with a discussion of past and present government policies 
affecting the industry, which provides a background for the subsequent 
policy analysis. 
2.1 Uses of the Coconut Palm 
Almost all parts of the coconut palm have economic utility. The 
trunk is used by the building industry to make pillars and rafters. The 
woven seasoned leaves provide cadjan, a material used in roofing. The 
ekles are used to manufacture brooms. The inflorescence can be seasoned 
and tapped to obtain sweet toddy which is an input for producing alcohol, 
vinegar, treacle, juggary and sugar. The water in the tender nut is a 
refreshing drink. But the major economic uses of the coconut palm are 
obtained from the matured coconut. The husks and the shells are inputs 
for fibre and shell products, while the kernel has a number of alternative 
uses. The fresh kernel is scraped, mixed with water and squeezed to 
extract milk for preparation of curries and sweets. The kernel can be 
dried to cure copra which is the input for oil. The extraction of oil 
from copra in turn provides a bi-product, copra meal (poonac). When 
the matured coconut kernel is seasoned, disintegrated and dried, the 
result is desiccated coconut. Because of these many uses coconut palm 
is popularly known as Kap Ruka (tree of life) in Sri Lanka. The present 
study is limited to the four major uses of the coconut kernel, namely 
for fresh/food nuts, copra, oil and desiccated coconut, which accounts 
for about 90 per cent of the total economic value of the coconut palm. 
2.2 Importance of the Sri Lankan Coconut Industry 
2.2.1 Domestically 
The coconut industry is an important part of the Sri Lankan economy 
in terms of land utilization, government revenue and export earnings as 
well as a staple food item. 
The Mahawansa - the ancient chronicle in Sri Lanka - has recorded 
the existence of coconut palms in the island as far back as 196 B.C. 
Until the British regime, where large-scale plantations were encouraged 
by enacting the Crown Land Encroachment Ordinance of 1840, coconut palms 
remained a part of the subsistence economy. As with the other plantation 
crops, the area under coconut expanded rapidly when the low-country 
(especially Western Province) crown reserves were alienated for coconut 
cultivation, until the Land Ordinance of 1840 was repealed and replaced 
in 1936 by the new Land Ordinance of 1935. Under the latter ordinance, 
crown land was no longer to be alienated for the expansion of plantation 
crops and the area under coconut virtually remained static (Table 2.1). 
The most recent data on crop acreage in Sri Lanka dates back to 
the 1962 Census of Agriculture, which estimated the area under coconut to 
be 1,152,418 acres, or 29 per cent of the total cultivated area of the 
island (Table 2.2). Two thirds of the coconut area is concentrated in 
three administrative districts north of Colombo, which is popularly 
TABLE 2 . 1 
A R E A UNDER COCONUT IN S R I L A N K A , 1860 - 1962 
Y e a r Area (in 1000 Acres) 
1 2 
1860 250 
1893 650 
1903 650 
1 9 2 1 820 
1929 1076 
1946 1 0 7 1 
1962 1152 
Source: (1) 1860 - 1929 Ferguson (1893) 
(2) Census of C e y l o n , 1946 
(3) Census of Agriculture, 1962 
TABLE 2.2 
UTILIZATION OF AGRICULTURAL LANDS - 1962 
(in 1000 Acres) 
Plantation Crops 2350.4 
Of w h i c h Tea 570.9 
Rubber 566.6 
Coconuts 1152.4 
Cocoa 29.4 
Cinnamon 31.1 
Paddy 1135.2 
O t h e r Food Crops 168.3 
Grasslands 32.6 
T o t a l 4040.9 
Source: Census o f Agriculture - 1962 
referred to as the 'coconut triangle'. The coastal belt south of 
Colombo through to Hambantota district ranks as the second most important 
area, adding a further 14 per cent (Table 2.3 and Map 2,1). 
TABLE 2.3 
LAND UNDER COCONUT CULTIVATION 
BY ADMINISTRATIVE DISTRICTS - 1962 
District Acreage Percentage 
1 2 3 
SRI LANKA 1,152,418 100.0 
Colombo 219,988 19.1 
Kalutara 37,652 3.3 
Kandy 20,931 1.8 
Matale 21,503 1.9 
Nuwara Eliya 1,441 0.1 
Galle 37,090 3.2 
Matara 37,278 3.2 
Hambantota 51,667 4.5 
Jaffna 30,543 2.7 
Mannar 3,352 0.0 
Vavunia 3,847 0.0 
Batticalo 15,946 1.4 
Amparai 7,737 0.1 
Trincomalee 4,259 0.1 
Kuriinegala 387,026 34.0 
Puttalam 145,579 12.6 
Anuradhapura 13,273 1.1 
Polonnaruwa 6,809 0.1 
Badulla 1,267 0.1 
Monaragala 7,120 0.1 
Ratnapura 28,179 2.5 
Kegalla 63,931 6.0 
Source: Census of Agriculture - 1962 
FIGURE 2.1 
DISTRIBUTION OF MAJOR COCONUT AREA IN 1962 
Major Coconut Area 
District Boundary 
Zone Boundary 
Source: The Ceylon Economic Atlas, 1969 
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Fresh coconut is the second most important food item consumed 
in the country, after rice. In 1919, Rutherford estimated the per 
capita consumption at 130-145 nuts per annum.^ More recent estimates 
are available from surveys conducted during the last two decades, 
according to which per capita consumption has remained at around 125 nuts 
per annum with little variation over the years.^ The increase in 
production has apparently been less than the growth in population, 
resulting in a gradual contraction of the exportable surplus. Table 2.4 
shows the actual nut equivalent exported, which when added to apparent 
domestic consumption of 125 nuts per head gives an estimate of total nut 
production each year. 
Coconuts and processed coconut products are the third biggest 
export earner after tea and rubber, providing not only foreign exchange 
but also an important source of export tax revenue. The latter accounted 
for 5 and 1 per cent of the government budget during the periods 1948-52 
and 1970-75 respectively (Table 2.5). 
2.2.2 Internationally 
In the world coconut economy Sri Lanka holds a relatively less 
important position in terms of both area under cultivation and coconut pro-
duct exports. In 1973 the area under cultivation in Sri Lanka accounted 
for only 7 per cent of the total acreage of coconuts, and coconut oil and 
copra exports from Sri Lanka accounted for 12 and 2 per cent respectively, 
1 Cited in the Agricultural Plan, 1958, Ministry of Agriculture, Colombo. 
2 Family Budget Survey - 1950, Central Bank of Ceylon, 125 nuts per 
annum; Consumer Finance Survey - 1953 & 1963, Central Bank of Ceylon, 
122 & 125 nuts per annum respectively; Socio-Economic Survey - 1969/70, 
Department of Census and Statistics, 12 5 nuts per annum. 
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TABLE 2.4 
ESTIMATED COCONUT PRODUCTION, CONSUMPTION AND EXPORTS 
IN SRI LANKA 
(In million nuts) 
Year Apparent Domestic 
Consumption 
Exports Estimated 
Production 
1 2 3 4 
1948 889 979 1868 
1949 915 953 1868 
1950 943 1039 1982 
1951 968 1270 2238 
1952 993 1462 2455 
1953 1019 1269 2288 
1954 1044 1180 2224 
1955 1074 1542 2616 
1956 1116 1429 2545 
1957 1146 962 2108 
1958 1174 935 2109 
1959 1203 1140 2343 
1960 1237 976 2213 
1961 1271 1360 2631 
1962 1305 1537 2842 
1963 1331 1216 2547 
1964 1363 1626 2989 
1965 1396 1279 2675 
1966 1430 1029 2459 
1967 1463 950 2413 
1968 1499 1103 2602 
1969 1532 905 2437 
1970 1564 880 2444 
1971 1600 1019 2619 
1972 1637 1258 2895 
1973 1595 351 1946 
1974 1534 495 2029 
1975 1671 914 2585 
1976 1236 1094 2330 
1977 1257 564 1821 
1978 1279 928 2207 
Note: Domestic consumption is assumed to be 125 nuts per person per annum. 
Source: (1) Coconut Statistics of Sri Lanka, 1945-73 
(2) Coconut Products Annual Review, 1973-78 
TABLE 2.5 
CONTRIBUTION OF EXPORT DUTIES ON COCONUT KERNEL PRODUCTS 
TO GOVERNMENT REVENUE 
(In Rs Million) 
12 
Period Total Government Custom Revenue 3 as a 
Revenue From Kernel Per cent 
Products Exports of 2 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
1948 540.6 32.1 6 
1949 576.1 36.7 6 
1950 623.3 36.7 6 
1951 835.9 47.6 6 
1952 875.3 28.2 3 
1953 871.4 32.8 4 
1954 941.0 35.5 4 
1955 1068.5 33.9 4 
1956 1160.5 28.7 2 
1957 1158.7 18.8 2 
1958 1186.5 16.3 1 
1959 1225.2 26.2 2 
1960 1293.6 23.9 2 
1961 1402.2 31.6 2 
1962 1507.6 32.7 2 
1963 1451.5 29.9 2 
1964 1620.0 44.5 3 
1965 1675.6 53.6 3 
1966 1726.9 25.3 2 
1967 1796.8 23.5 1 
1968 1952.5 75.7 4 
1969 2536.0 41.9 2 
1970 2736.7 52.3 2 
1971 2817.7 53.4 2 
1972 4125.6 25.0 -
1973 4034.0 32.6 -
1974 4786.7 161.8 3 
1975 5083.5 65.1 1 
Source: (1) 
(2) 
Statistical Abstract of Ceylon 
Coconut Products Annual Review 
13 
of international supplies between 1969 and 1972. (Since 1974 the Sri 
Lankan government has restricted copra exports to limited quantities of 
edible copra.) Thus in these two commodities Sri Lanka is a 'price taker* 
in the world market. However, in the case of d.c. exports, Sri Lanka 
contributes about 40 per cent of the world exports, sharing the international 
market with the Philippines in the proportions 4:6. Sri Lanka is therefore 
a 'price maker' to some extent in the world d.c. market, as it is with 
respect to the world market for edible copra, to which Sri Lanka contributes 
about 95 per cent. 
2.3 Coconut Growing 
Coconut cultivation in Sri Lanka has the characteristics of a dual 
economy. Being a staple food, coconut is grown as a subsistence crop in 
home gardens. With the economic transformation following the introduction 
of commercial plantations, the centuries-old barter system was replaced by 
a monetary economy. To acquire the benefits of the new economy the 
indigenous people expanded their area under coconut to produce a marketable 
surplus. However, due to limited land and capital resources most coconut 
plantations were mainly medium-sized {2h to 50 acre). Hence three forms 
of coconut cultivation are now clearly visible. As shown in Table 2.6 
the cultivations below 2h acres - which amount to 20 per cent of the total 
area - are predominantly subsistence home gardens. On the other hand, 
only 27 per cent of cultivations are in the large plantation sector, while 
the balance (53 per cent) belongs to the group which produces a marketable 
surplus in addition to family subsistence requirements. 
Coconut production during the period 1948-78 averaged 2,365 
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TABLE 2.6 
SIZE STRUCTURE OF COCONUT PLANTATIONS - 1962 
Size of Holding Percent of the Cumulative 
(In acres) Total Acreage Percentage 
1 2 1 
0 to h 1.9 1.9 
-a to 1 3.6 5.5 
1 to 13.7 19.7 
2h to 5 15.5 34.7 
5 to 10 15.4 50.1 
10 to 25 14.0 64.1 
25 to 50 8.9 73.0 
Above 50 27.0 100.0 
Source: Census of Agriculture - 1962 
million nuts per annum. The production gradually increased from 1948 
until it reached a peak in 1964 (Table 2.4), a trend which has been 
attributed to increased fertilizer application and replacement of senile 
palms. The yearly fluctuations in production, arising from climatic 
factors, are evident from the production data of Table 2.4. 
2.4 Processed Coconut Products 
Nearly half the annual coconut crop is utilized by the copra and 
d.c. processing sectors (Table 2.7). Most of the copra produced is 
further processed to extract oil, and nearly half the oil produced is 
consumed domestically in the form of cooking oil and industrial inputs. 
All the d.c. produced is exported, as is the remaining half of the oil as 
well as a small proportion of the copra. The utilization pattern of 
coconuts is illustrated in Figure 2.2. 
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TABLE 2.7 
PATTERN OF COCONUT UTILIZATION, 1972 TO 1978 
(per cent of total production) 
UTILIZATION Year 
1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 
To food nuts 40 61 60 48 53 69 58 
To copra production 48 26 26 39 34 20 29 
(of which to oil) (40) (25) (26) (37) (33) (19) (29) 
To d.c. production 12 13 14 13 13 11 13 
100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Source: Coconut Products Annual Review, 1973-78. 
FIGURE 2.2 
UTILIZATION PATTERN OF COCONUTS, 
Domestic Consumption Exports 
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2.4.1 Copra 
The kernel of the coconut is cured to produce copra by sun-drying, 
kiln-drying, or a combination of both methods. In addition to the large 
estates and copra dealers, who acquire their nut requirements from small-
holders, d.c. mills also produce copra from nuts rejected in the process 
of d.c. production. From information obtained by the Coconut Marketing 
Board (CMB) which is based on the copra dealers and estates registered 
with the CMB to participate in copra auctions, it appears that there are 
more than 700 copra curing units in Sri Lanka. 
During the 1948-78 period, copra production averaged 218,000 
metric tons (MT) per annum (Table 2.8). However, due to the further 
processing of copra into oil, the quantity available for export is the 
residual and averaged 30,000 MT per annum during the period 1948-52 and 
reduced to an average of 900 MT for the period 1974-78. The restrictions 
on copra exports since 1973 have allowed only limited exports of high 
valued edible copra to markets in Pakistan and the Middle East. 
2.4.2 Oil 
Oil is extracted from copra through a mechanical process. About 
70 mills are involved with an estimated total capacity of 280,000 MT per 
annum. This includes two public sector mills with a total capacity of 
40,000 MT per annum. The quantity of oil produced in Sri Lanka which 
averaged to 122,000 MT per annum during the periods 1948-57 and 1958-67, 
declined to 100,000 MT during the period 1968-78, The volume exported 
also declined from 87,000 MT per annum during the period 1948-57 to 49,000 
MT by 1968-78 (Table 2.8). The gradual increase in domestic oil consumption 
has reduced the exportable surplus in recent years. 
2.4.3 Desiccated Coconut 
Desiccated coconut is manufactured from the white meat of the 
17 
TABLE 2.8 
PRODUCTION AND EXPORTS OF THREE MAIN KERNEL 
PRODUCTS - 1948-77 
(In 1000 Metric Tons) 
Year Production 
Copra 
2 
Oil 
3 
D.C. 
4 
Exports 
Copra 
5 
Oil 
6 
1948 230, .9 107, .9 12, .1 55 .5 76 .9 
1949 223. .4 122, .1 15. .9 25 .0 90 .6 
1950 200, .1 109, .9 45. .6 21 .5 76 .9 
1951 256, .0 145. .4 40. .4 19, .7 115 .5 
1952 274, .0 143, .2 56, .5 41, .4 108 .4 
1953 234, .1 130, .7 58, .2 21. .7 95. .1 
1954 219, .9 106, .5 56, .1 46, .8 70. .0 
1955 290, .9 136, .3 58, .8 69. .5 98. .8 
1956 262, ,2 125, .3 64, .8 58. .7 86. .3 
1957 189, .8 95, .1 49. .7 35, .3 54, ,9 
1958 170. .7 87, .7 57. ,6 28, .1 45. .0 
1959 226. .4 112, .7 53. ,3 43, .3 70. ,6 
1960 192. ,4 100. ,2 55. ,3 29, .6 56. .9 
1961 279. ,9 93. ,3 49. ,1 55, ,9 93. ,3 
1962 316. ,7 149. .6 49. ,8 73, .5 104. .0 
1963 253. .2 128. .9 51, ,6 43, .8 82. .4 
1964 330. ,1 166. .8 50, ,9 59. ,0 119. .4 
1965 264. ,5 137. ,2 54, .3 41. ,6 88. ,3 
1966 222. ,8 124. ,0 48, ,0 21. ,2 74. .0 
1967 211. ,3 120. ,2 47, .8 16. ,1 67, ,8 
1968 210, ,8 116, ,5 71, ,1 21. .6 64, .1 
1969 197, .6 109, .7 55, ,5 19. ,4 56. 1 
1970 198, .6 112, .6 54, ,9 15, ,5 57. 9 
1971 222. .9 126. ,4 54. ,8 17, ,5 79. 8 
1972 282. ,2 146, ,4 49. ,1 44, ,3 81. 8 
1973 118, .7 71, ,4 37, ,7 2, ,8 9. 9 
1974 125, ,2 77. .1 42, ,6 ,4 25. 5 
1975 196. .8 120, .3 59. 3 1. ,4 68. 9 
1976 164, .1 100. .2 46, 0 1, .3 59. 0 
1977 65, .0 39. ,9 30. ,4 ,3 2. 1 
1978 130. 0 80. 1 41. 6 9 28. 3 
Note: The method of estimation in production date are given in 
Section 3.3. 
Source: (1) 1948-56 estimates based on the above method 
(2) Coconut Statistics of Sri Lanka, 1945-73 
(3) Coconut Products Annual Review, 1973-78 
(4) Ceylon Custom Returns 
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kernel by a process of disintegration and drying at 60-70 C to a moisture 
content of less than 2.5 per cent. Sri Lanka's share in the international 
market for d.c. which averaged to 46,000 MT per annum during the period 
1948-57, increased to 52,000 MT by 1958-67. However, this declined to 
49,000 MT per annum during the period 1968-78 (Table 2.8). In contrast 
to the Philippines, where the entire production is concentrated in 7 large 
mills, Sri Lanka's production originates from about 70 mills with an average 
processing capacity of 3.5-4.5 MT per day. Of the total, seven mills are 
owned by cooperative societies, and the Coconut Processing Board (CPB) 
manages another mill for the purpose of d.c. research and development. 
The entire d.c. production is exported. Both production and exports come 
under the stringent control of the CPB. 
2.5 Marketing of Coconut Kernel Products 
The marketing of coconut products can be considered under two 
categories, namely the domestic and export markets. 
The marketable surplus of fresh nuts amounts to approximately 85 
per cent of total production, a substantial portion of this surplus 
originating from estates. The marketable surplus is disposed of in one 
of three ways, namely for domestic food nut requirements, to produce copra 
or d.c. 
Economies of size enable larger estates to cure copra at the 
point of nut production itself. When they sell nuts to the d.c. sector 
or to the domestic food nut market, however, they use the services of 
auctioneers and brokers of whom there were 55 in 1972. Smallholders sell 
their nuts either directly to d.c. mills, to cooperative societies (if they 
are members) or to village-level dealers. 
2.5.1 Food Nuts 
Although public sector institutions such as the Department of 
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Marketing, co-operative retail outlets and the Coconut Cultivation Board 
(CCB) have more recently engaged in retail marketing food nuts are pre-
dominantly in the hands of private dealers and retailers. 
2.5.2 Copra 
As shown in Table 2.7, about one-third of the coconut crop is 
used to produce copra, much of which is then used by the oil milling 
sector, the balance being exported. The oil millers buy their copra 
requirements directly from the estates or through brokers. In an attempt 
to ensure a fair price to copra producers, the Ceylon Coconut Board (CyCB) 
in 1960 made it a requirement that oil producers purchase their copra 
requirements at the copra auctions held by the Board. However, millers 
bought at auctions only the quantities of copra equivalent to the oil 
production they planned to export, while still obtaining their requirements 
for the domestic market from other sources of supply. The copra export 
trade is in the hands of the private sector. 
2.5.3 Oil 
Nearly half the oil produced in the country is consumed domestically 
either directly as cooking oil or indirectly as margarine and soap. The 
domestic oil trade is solely in the hands of private sector wholesale and 
retail dealers who purchase their requirements from oil millers. Between 
1948 and 1972, the oil export trade was operated by private sector export-
ers whose export prices came under the scrutiny of the CyCB. In 1972, 
however, the CMB^ became the sole buyer from millers of coconut oil for 
export under the Price Stablization Scheme, while using shippers as export 
agents. 
1 The functions of CyCB were taken over by the CMB after the reorganization 
in 1972 under the Coconut Development Act of 1971. 
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2.5.4 Desiccated Coconut 
All d.c. production in Sri Lanka is exported. The d.c. shippers 
normally sell forward to foreign buyers for a period varying from three 
to six months, and to cover these transactions they buy forward from millers. 
The brokers in the Colombo market act as intermediaries in the buying and 
selling operation between millers and shippers. About 30 shippers operate 
in the d.c. export trade and this includes one public sector institution 
(Consol-Expo). With the imposition of quantitative restrictions on d.c. 
exports in November 1976, the sale procedure was modified in an attempt 
to raise international prices and thereby enhance foreign exchange earnings. 
To achieve this objective, the CMB initiated an auction system to sell 
limited quantities. With recent improvements in coconut production, the 
normal sale procedure was resumed in 1978. 
The internal marketing structure is illustrated in Figure 2.3. 
2.6 Institutional Framework 
The coconut industry comes under the purview of the Ministry of 
Coconut Industry (MCI). The MCI is a portfolio established in September 
1978, outside the cabinet, and is linked to the cabinet through the 
Ministry of Plantation Industry (MPI). With the establishment of the MPI 
in 1970, all public sector institutions concerned with the coconut industry 
were brought under one roof. Prior to this, the Ministry of Agriculture 
and Ministry of Trade shared, respectively, the production and trade 
aspects of the industry. There was a lack of co-ordination as well as 
overshadowing of the main functions of these two Ministries. Despite this 
the industry was placed under the apex of a central authority - the 
FIGURE 2.3 
MARKET STRUCTURE OF COCONUT PRODUCTS 
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Coconut Development Authority - which was responsible for co-ordinating 
and centralization of the functional boards as sought by the establishment 
of the MPI. 
The CDA is responsible to the Minister as the policy advisor 
for the industry as well as the policy implementation agency. The four 
boards - Coconut Cultivation Board, Coconut Research Board (CRB), Coconut 
Processing Board, and Coconut Marketing Board - come under the direct 
purview of the CDA. 
The CCB is responsible for the development of the coconut growing 
industry through programmes aimed at increasing coconut production and 
productivity by popularising modern input utilization and replacement 
of old palms, maximizing economic utilization of lands cultivated with 
coconuts, training of cultivators, extension and demonstration. 
The role of CRB is scientific research in respect of the growth 
and cultivation of coconut palms, prevention and cure of diseases and 
pests, experimentations on associated crops and animal husbandry in 
coconut plantations. 
The CPB bears the responsibility of research and development 
as well as the regulation of processing industries, while the CMB's role 
is to regulate the coconut trade for the benefit of the producers as well 
as the country as a whole. The institutional framework of the coconut 
industry is illustrated in Figure 2.4. 
2.7 Government Policies 
Since 1948 the Sri Lankan coconut industry has been subjected 
to various and extensive government intervention measures. To simplify the 
1 The functions of the CRI are taken over by the CRB after the re-
organization in 1972 under the Coconut Development Act of 1971. 
23 
FIGURE 2,4 
INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK OF THE COCONUT INDUSTRY 
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a n a l y s i s , these intervention measures are broadly grouped into domestic 
policies aimed at increasing production and productivity in the industry and 
trade policies aimed at assisting domestic consumers and raising 
government revenue. The input and production subsidies and price 
stabilization scheme belongs to the former while copra auctions, bans or 
restrictions on exports of k e r n e l products and export duties are grouped 
in the latter. 
2.7.1 Domestic Policies to Assist Producers 
The lack of growth of the area under production and of yield p e r 
acre in the face of expanding domestic demand has led to a f a l l in 
exportable surplus which caused the first national government in 1949 to 
o r d e r a R o y a l Commission to recommend a strategy to re-vitalize the 
coconut industry. The Commission concluded that the potential for 
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expanding coconut acreage is limited so it emphasized the need for 
increasing productivity in the existing plantations through encouragement 
of widespread applications of fertilizer and replacement of senile palms 
with vigorous seedlings (Coconut Commission 1949). 
a. Fertilizer Subsidy Scheme: In order to encourage the 
widespread use of fertilizers in coconut cultivation, the government in 
1956 started a fertilizer subsidy scheme under which fertilizer was supplied 
to the coconut cultivators at half cost. A dramatic increase in fertilizer 
application was subsequently experienced, until the mid 1960s when 
fertilizer prices increased sharply. The price of fertilizer in 1976 
was 600 per cent higher in current terms than in 1956. Between 1956 and 
1977, fertilizer issued under the subsidy scheme has averaged 45,567 MT 
per annum, which was sufficient to fertilize 231,239 acres or 20 per cent 
of the acreage if the recommended dosages were used ^ (Table 2.9), 
b. Coconut Seedling Subsidy Scheme: In 1948, even before the 
submission of the recommendations of the Coconut Commission, the CRI of 
Sri Lanka launched a scheme to supply selected coconut seedlings to 
coconut cultivators at a subsidized rate (charging only half the cost of 
production from private cultivators and a quarter the cost from co-
operative societies), as an attempt to replace the senile low yielding area 
reported by the Census of Ceylon, 1946. (Census of Ceylon, 1946 reported 
10 per cent of the coconut acreage to have palms over 60 years of age.) 
1 The recommended dosages are as follows: 
Up to 1955: lb/palm per annum; 
1956-67: 7 lb/palm per annum; 
1968-to date: 9 lb/palm per annum. 
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TABLE 2. 9 
FERTILIZER ISSUES AND PRICES UNDER THE 
SUBSIDY SCHEME: 1956-1977 
Year Quantity Area Average 
Equalent Subsidized 
Price 
(Rs/MT) 
1 2 3 4 
1956 32,514 160,000 131 
1957 35,562 175,000 148 
1958 39,047 192,150 136 
1959 44,707 220,000 139 
1960 42,853 210,880 134 
1961 39,423 194,000 132 
1962 45,705 224,915 134 
1963 49,469 243,435 154 
1964 47,153 232,040 156 
1965 50,907 250,510 163 
1966 54,818 269,760 171 
1967 50,384 255,965 168 
1968 64,224 245,813 232 
1969 61,879 236,837 247 
1970 63,359 242,503 246 
1971 60,098 230,020 228 
1972 45,556 174,362 237 
1973 50,142 191,917 457 
1974 39,942 152,876 452 
1975 24,856 95,133 649 
1976 30,683 117,437 814 
1977 29,184 111,701 580 
Source: Coconut Statistics of Sri Lanka, 1945-73 
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The seedlings distributed under the subsidy scheme are not 
exclusively for replanting.^ Some of them are used for supplying 
vacancies and a few for new planting. By leaving an allowance for 
seedlings obtained from private nurseries, it would appear that 449,269 
acres or 39 per cent of the total area under coconut was replanted 
between 1948 to 1977, which amounts to 15,000 acres or 1 per cent of the 
total area per annum (Table 2.10). 
c. Coconut Rehabilitation Subsidy Scheme: This scheme came 
into operation in 1974 to: (i) financially assist the rehabilitation of 
existing coconut lands by establishing contour drains for the purpose of 
soil and moisture conservation; (ii) fill vacancies and; (iii) remove 
excess palms. It was expected that this measure would partly counteract 
the.adverse effects of the declining trend in fertilizer application. 
At the end of 1977 the expenditure on this subsidy package amounted to 
Rs 2.26 mn. 
d. Subsidy Scheme for New Plantings: The limitation of the 
area for expansion has been known since the days of the Coconut Commission 
in 1949. According to a survey conducted by the CRI in 1951 and 
reported by the IBRD Mission in 1952, out of about 183,000 acres investi-
gated, 110,000 acres were thought to be 'probably or possibly' suitable 
for coconut cultivation. This is, however, stated to be marginal. The 
Land Utilization Commission (1968) reported the area suitable for new 
plantations to be only 50,000 acres. 
As a measure of achieving full production potential, a subsidy scheme 
for New Plantings was started in 1976 to cultivate coconut in all suitable 
1 The term 'replanting' also includes 'under planting'. 
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TABLE 2.10 
AREA EQUIVALENT OF SEEDLINGS ISSUED UNDER THE SUBSIDY SCHEME 
Year Acreage Cumulative 
Acreage 
1 2 3 
1948 ^ 6030 6030 
1949 6172 12202 
1950 6316 18518 
1951 6750 25268 
1952 6840 32108 
1953 6790 38898 
1954 6728 45626 
1955 9402 55028 
1956 10520 65548 
1957 13673 79221 
1958 14760 93981 
1959 17431 111412 
1960 23317 134729 
1961 27690 162490 
1962 20090 182518 
1963 23715 206233 
1964 17240 223473 
1965 16006 239479 
1966 18003 257482 
1967 18876 276358 
1968 21520 297878 
1969 19623 317501 
1970 20458 337959 
1971 19948 357907 
1972 18800 376707 
1973 14139 390846 
1974 14206 405052 
1975 17434 422486 
1976 13112 435598 
1977 13671 449269 
Note: 64 seedlings are planted per acre on average, 
Source: Coconut Statistics of Sri Lanka, 1945-73 
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lands. The scheme consisted of two groups. Under one:group,rsiibsidies 
were granted on a per acre basis (Rs 2,OQO),tWhile under the other, the 
subsidy to" be dispersed on a per:palm basis (Rs 23), for newhplantings-in 
home gardens. The subsidies covered about three-quartersdof the-estimated 
cost of establishment. 
e. Incentives for Associated Crops: A notable change in 
government strategy towards the coconut industry took place in the early 
1970s. As evident from fertilizer and seedling subsidy schemes, the 
emphasis lay solely on increasing coconut production. The drawback 
in this emphasis was the lack of consideration of the profitability in 
pure coconut cultivation. Under the average conditions during the 
period 1948-69, the net income from an acre of pure coconut amounted to 
Rs 320 per annum or Rs 26.66 a month.^ This amounted to Rs 4.84 per 
2 
family member per month. 
The profitability in pure coconut cultivation could be supple-
mented by associated cropping in coconut lands, which enables the per 
acre income to be increased. On average 64 coconut palms per acre are 
planted at a distance of 21' x 21', leaving a substantial portion of 
land between rows for associated cropping. 
Hence in the 1970s, while continuing to increase the productivity 
of the coconut palm, the government also attempted to increase per acre 
income in coconut plantations by providing input subsidies for the 
cultivation of pasture and selected perennial crops. The pasture scheme 
1 (Average yield per acre) x (Price per 1,000 nuts - Cost of production 
per 1,000 nuts) = Net income, i.e. 2,000 x (224 - 64) / 1,000 = 320. 
2 By taking the average family size as 5.5, i.e. (26.66/5.5) = 4.84. 
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which had the objective of supplementing the income of coconut 
cultivators through the establishment of pasture and fodder in coconut 
lands, started with a cash subsidy of Rs 120 per acre in 1973 and 
which subsequently increased to Rs 300. Research conducted by the CRB 
revealed that pasture does not compete with coconut palms for moisture 
or soil nutrients when interplanted in coconut lands. The CRB thus 
recommended its establishment in areas where the rainfall is favourable. 
By the end of 1977, Rs 0.77 mn had been dispersed under the pasture 
subsidy scheme. 
The impact of the pasture subsidy scheme is limited not only by 
climatic factors but also by economic factors. The demand for pasture 
is a derived demand for dairy and livestock products, thus the expansion 
of area under pasture is mainly dependent on the spread of livestock 
industries. The relative stagnation in the pasture subsidy scheme 
recently could be attributed to the slow growth rate in the dairy and 
livestock industry. 
The dependence of the associated cropping programme in coconut 
lands on the dairy and livestock industry was to a greater extent 
emancipated with the introduction of the subsidy scheme for selected 
perennial crops in coconut lands in 1976. Under this scheme, three 
perennial crops were promoted: cocoa, coffee and pepper. These crops 
are interplanted in areas where soil and climatic conditions are favour-
able, and three-quarters of the cost of establishment is provided by the 
government as an outright grant. 
f. Price Stabilization Scheme for Coconut Oil: The world 
market price of coconut o i l is treated as the major determinant of the 
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internal market price of coconut products. During the period January 
1971 to October 1972, the world market price of coconut oil varied from 
€158 to i76 per ton, with a corresponding fluctuation of Rsl,525 to 
Rs875 per ton in the domestic market. As a result, the average 
domestic price of fresh coconuts fluctuated between Rs200 to Rs90 per 
1,000 nuts during the same period. A price stabilization scheme 
financed and launched by the government in 1972 can be regarded as a 
package to ensure a stable and 'fair' price to coconut producers. 
Under the scheme, the CMB purchases oil for export at the 
'stabilized' price from oil millers, and the oil so purchased is made 
available to exporters at prices determined by the world market. The 
average market price prevailing in the previous ten years is taken as 
the stabilized price. Once the stable price is fixed for coconut oil, 
it is expected that it will pass on to coconut producers, via the copra 
auctions. To ensure that smallholders benefit from the scheme as much 
as estate owners, the CMB launched a scheme to organise smallholders 
into co-operative societies so they could bypass private copra dealers 
who may not have passed on the scheme's benefits. 
The consequence of the scheme is that the CMB acts as a buffer 
between the world market and the domestic market and absorbs all the 
price variations in the world market. 
2.7.2 Trade Policies to Assist Domestic Consumers and Raise 
Government Revenue 
A number of trade policies have been introduced since 1948, with 
the objective of assisting domestic consumers and raising government 
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revenue. In this section, however, only four schemes will be considered: 
the Copra Auctions, the ban on oil and copra exports, restrictions on 
d.c. exports, and export duties, all of which are still in operation. 
a. Copra Auctions: With the objective of ensuring a 'fair' 
price to producers, the government in 1960 started regular copra 
auctions under the supervision of the CyCB. The copra produced by the 
registered copra producers and copra producing co-operatives are put up 
for auction under this scheme. Table 2.11 is a statement of the trans-
actions taking place at the auctions during the period 1960-73. 
The objectives of the copra auctions were not fully realized 
because of collusion amongst buyers or insufficient number of buyers to provide 
adequate price competition. So from time to time the government inter-' 
vened at the auctions to keep the copra prices at about what was judged 
to be the perfectly competitive free market level. The Department 
of Commodity Purchase entered the copra auctions in 1969 with a view to 
stimulating the price which had reached very low levels at that time. 
It continued to participate until the end of May 1970. By 1972, the 
government realized that the lower prices fetched at the auctions resulted 
from the price leadership of the BCC, hence it acquired that organization 
to use its power to influence price. (The BCC has since withdrawn from 
the copra auctions.) 
b. Ban on Copra and Oil Exports: In 1973 Sri Lanka experienced 
a very poor crop, producing only 1,946 million nuts which represented a 
drop of one-third over the previous year and about 25 per cent less than 
the average level of production during the period 1963-72. As a result, 
the exportable surplus dropped to 30 per cent of the 1972 level - from 
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TABLE 2.11 
COPRA SOLD AT THE AUCTIONS (In MT) - 1960-73 
Year Quantity 
1 2 
1960 111,949 
1961 162,487 
1962 185,798 
1963 165,859 
1964 191,315 
1965 157,060 
1966 123,475 
1967 95,111 
1968 90,335 
1969 107,796 
1970 91,544 
1971 119,735 
1972 143,613 
1973 24,582 
Source: Coconut Statistics of Sri Lanka, 1945-73 
1,232 to 370 million nuts. The government therefore decided in February 
and March 1973 to ban copra and oil exports, respectively, to ensure 
that sufficient quantities were available for domestic consumption. 
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With a more normal level of production in 1974, some restricted overseas 
sales for oil were allowed and exports of copra were restricted to edible 
qualities ( a relatively minor portion of total copra production). This 
pattern is still continuing. 
With a more normal level of production in 1974, 
some restricted overseas sales for oil were allowed and exports of 
copra were restricted to edible qualities (a relatively minor portion 
of total copra production). This pattern is still continuing. 
c. Restrictions on d.c. Exports: In 1977, coconut production 
was estimated to be 1,821 million nuts, even less than the 1973 pro-
duction level and the lowest ever recorded in the history of the coconut 
industry. Due to competition from the processing industries for the 
limited coconuts available, the price of food nuts reached record levels. 
The average retail price in the Colombo market rose to .92 cts per nut 
in 1977, compared with an average of .41 cts in the preceding 5 years. 
On this occasion the government intervened by banning again the export 
of fresh nuts, copra and oil (where limited quantities were exported) 
and imposing quantitative restrictions on d.c. exports, with the objective 
of protecting domestic consumers from rising nut prices and ensuring 
sufficient quantities of coconuts for domestic consumption. 
Under the quantitative restrictions the export of d.c. was 
reduced to nearly two-thirds of its normal levels. Export sales 
quotas were apportioned weekly and sold to the highest bidder(s) at an 
auction conducted by the CMB. 
As a result of these quantitative restrictions, production at 
the factory level was brought under a quota system which resulted, on 
average, in employment being reduced to about 3 days of work per week. 
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To compensate workers engaged in d.c. production for the resulting loss 
of wages, a scheme was introduced to maintain weekly wages at previous 
levels. This scheme was financed by imposing a tax on d.c. production. 
High export prices for d.c. - due in part to d.c. export 
restrictions - resulted in large super-normal profits for exporters, 
so the government formulated a scheme to acquire part of these profits 
by imposing a further export tax, based on f.o.b. prices realized. 
d . Export Duties: Duties from coconuts and processed coconut 
product exports account for only 1 per cent of the present government 
revenue. 
A scheme of ad valorem duties based on f.o.b. prices prevailed 
at the time of independence (1948) until 1963, with the exception of the 
years 1951-53. During those two years and subsequent to 1963, a scheme 
of sliding scale export duties operated. Under the latter scheme, 
duty in a given week was at first calculated on the basis of the previous 
week's average London c.i.f. price of Straits (i.e. Singapore) coconut 
oil. The basis was subsequently changed to weekly averages and then to 
a four weekly moving average of the Philippines' copra price in the 
London market. The sliding scale scheme had a number of short-comings, 
the reliability of the reported prices and the basing of the duty on the 
main competitor's product prices being of major concern. These short-
comings and the strong position the CMB held in the coconut product 
market led the government to re-introduce, in June 1975, ad valorem 
duties based on more accurately recorded Colombo f.o.b. prices for kernel 
products. 
These ad valorem duties were in operation only for a few months 
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before being abolished in November 1975 when producers were receiving 
low prices. In November 1978, after a period of duty-free exports, a 
new scheme of ad valorem duties (combined with production and development 
taxes) were introduced for the export of coconut and processed coconut 
products. 
2.8 Summary 
The coconut industry in Sri Lanka is important to the country as 
the major land user, an important source of government revenue and 
foreign exchange earnings and as a staple food item. Nearly two-thirds 
of the coconut produced is consumed domestically in the form of food nuts 
or oil and the balance is exported in the form of copra, d.c. and oil. 
The coconut industry is managed by the Ministry of Coconut Industry, 
through functional boards established under the apex of the CDA. The 
important position held by the coconut industry in the economic life of 
the country has resulted in much government intervention, the effects of 
which are analysed in the following chapters. 
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CHAPTER 3 
THE DEMAND FOR AND SUPPLY OF COCONUTS AND 
PROCESSED COCONUT PRODUCTS 
The analysis of government policies affecting the coconut industry 
and of possible alternatives would of course be facilitated by estimates 
of relevant short run and long run demand and supply elasticities. This 
chapter reports on an attempt to model the industry at the national level 
and use the model to estimate empirically the elasticities of demand for 
and supply of coconuts and processed coconut products in the domestic and 
international markets.^ 
3.1 A Simple Economic Model 
In postulating a model for the coconut industry in Sri Lanka, one 
can identify a number of supply functions relating to: (i) output response; 
and (ii) marketed surplus of the coconut growing industry, the latter con-
tributing to the supply of food nuts for domestic consumption, processing 
and export markets; (iii) industrial copra supply for the domestic oil 
industry; (iv) edible copra supply for the export market; (v) oil supply 
for the domestic and export markets; and (vi) d.c. supply for export 
markets. It also consists of the following demand functions: (i) the 
demand for fresh nuts by the domestic consumers, processers and exporters; 
(ii) domestic processer demand for industrial copra; (iii) export demand 
It turns out, however, that in most cases the necessary data are too 
inadequate for such empirical work, so that reliance must be placed 
on a priori judgments about and previous empirical estimates of the 
relevant parameters. The results of the estimated equations are given 
in Appendix 3.1. However, they turnout to be inconsistent with 
expectations. 
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for edible copra; (iv) export and domestic demand for oil; and (v) export 
demand for d.c. 
3.1.1 Aggregate Coconut Production and Marketed Surplus 
In postulating a model of output response of coconuts in Sri Lanka 
it is necessary to take into account the following characteristics of the 
palm: (i) a seven years gestation period from the year of planting to the 
initial bearing; (ii) a further eight years involved in reaching maturity; 
(iii) relatively stable yields from the 15th year to the 60th year; and 
(iv) a gradual decline in yields after the 60th year. Because of these 
characteristics, decisions on planting coconuts are a function of the 
long-term investment prospects, which depend on expected productivity 
and prices not only of coconuts but also of associated crops which can be 
interplanted with palms. One might therefore assume that the output of 
coconuts in any one year is independent of current prices. Expressed 
algebraically, coconut supply response can be written as: 
Q = f (P^, A^, P^, P3, P4, T, R) (3.1) 
where Q = quantity of coconuts produced 
p^ = price of coconuts 
A = bearing acreage b 
P^ = price of factor inputs 
P^ = price of competing products 
P^ = prices of associated crops 
T = technology 
R = rainfall 
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In the short run wherein bearing acreage remains constant, 
Q = A^ . Y 3.2 
s h 
where A^ = area harvested (since all the bearing acreage may 
not be harvested at any one time) 
Y = yield/acre of area harvested 
With any given A ^ , 
Y = f (E A , F., M , R) 3.3 
Jci 1 
where Z A^^^ = harvested acreage of the k^^ age 
F^ = variables to represent factor inputs 
M = a variable to represent management 
R = rainfall in producing areas 
In the long run wherein productive capacity is changing, a change 
in mature acreage would be mainly due to lagged response of new plantings 
and replantings, stemming from the profitability of investments. Thus: 
^ V = Vv V7 - \ 
where R^ ^ = acreage replanted seven years earlier 
^ = acreage newly planted seven years earlier 
L^ = net loss of acreage due to the senility, urban 
development, diseases, etc. 
The predominent subsistence nature of the coconut growing industry 
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and the high level of on-farm consumption necessitates the estimation of 
residual supply - marketed surplus response - in addition to the output 
response of coconuts. In subsistence agriculture marketed supply is the 
residual of total output produced after household consumption needs have 
been satisfied. The household consumption involved leads producers to 
react differently to the change in prices, compared with producers of 
commercial crops (Yotopoulos and Nugent 1975, p.140). One would expect 
an increase in the price in coconuts, ceteris paribus, to induce consumers 
to substitute now relatively cheaper staple foods for coconuts. But an 
increase in the price of coconuts also boosts growers'revenue, enabling 
subsistence producers to consume more of everything including coconuts. 
Hence the marketed surplus may increase or decrease following a price 
change, depending on whether or not the substitution effect dominates the 
income effect. 
Two approaches have been used by researchers in estimating the 
elasticity of marketed surplus: (i) the direct; and (ii) indirect approaches. 
Under the direct method, a relationship is estimated between the marketed 
surplus and the price of crops concerned relative to the prices of 
competing crops. The modified indirect approach suggested by Krishna(1967) 
attempts an approximation of the elasticity of marketed surplus in 
situations where data is limited. Krishna's model is of the following form: 
3 5 
M 9P Q 8P • M 3Q 
where P 3M = price elasticity of marketed surplus 
M ^ 
p ^ = price elasticity of output 
Q 
£ ^ = output elasticity of marketed surplus 
M 3Q 
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This method has two limitations. Firstly equation 3.5 implies that the 
only income relevant in determining the demand for home consumption of 
coconut is the cash income derived from marketed surplus of nuts. But 
it is the total net income of the household that is relevant. Secondly 
consumption is not a function of price of coconut relative to alternative 
crops in household production, but of the price of coconuts relative to 
alternatives in household consumption (Yotopoulos and Nugent 1976, p.141). 
3.1.2 Other Supply Functions 
Given the market surplus of coconuts, its price tends to be 
determined on the basis of the price of oil, so the volume supplied to 
various uses depends more on the relative prices between coconut products. 
a. Supply of Nuts. 
Coconut producers have the option of supplying nuts either as 
food nuts, as inputs to the processing sector, or as fresh nuts to the 
export markets. The options available to the suppliers depend on the 
relative profitability in each market represented by the product prices. 
Since the volume of fresh nuts exported is small (as a result of export 
restrictions), its price has relatively little or no effect on the other 
two markets. Hence, three separate supply relations are assumed to be 
of the following functional form: 
t 
= f (PFW^, PPW^) 3.6 
= f (PPW^, PFW^) 3.7 
= f (PNF^, PFW^, PPW^) 3.8 
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where SND = supply of food nuts to the domestic market 
PFW = wholesale price of food nuts 
PPW = wholesale price of industrial nuts 
SNP = supply of nuts to the processing sector 
SNF = supply of nuts to export markets 
PNF = foreign price of nuts, after adjusting for export duties 
b. Supply of Copra. 
In Sri Lanka, copra is supplied by two distinct groups: industrial 
and edible copra suppliers. Since 1973, the entire industrial copra output 
has been supplied to the domestic oil processing industry and the entire 
edible copra output to the export market. Hence the supply of the former 
is assumed to be influenced by its domestic price while the latter by its 
foreign price. Supply is also influenced of course by the price of the 
major input, namely, fresh nuts. Hence, two separate copra supply 
relations are assumed to be of the following functional form: 
SIC^ = f (PIC^, PFW^) 3.9 
SEC^ = f (PEC^, PFW^) 3.10 
where SIC = supply of industrial copra 
PIC = price of industrial copra 
PEC = price of edible copra, after adjusting for export duties 
SEC = supply of edible copra 
Others as defined earlier 
c. Supply of Oil. 
The foreign price of coconut oil, which is determined in the 
international lauric oil market, is the main factor influencing the price 
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of S r i Lankan coconut oil. (Although nearly half the o i l produced is 
domestically consumed, the domestic price depends heavily on the foreign 
price of oil.) The bans and export restrictions as w e l l as the capacity 
utilized in the o i l mills determine the volume supplied at any point of 
time. So too does the price of copra, the major input. The o i l supply 
so determined is assumed to take the following functional form: 
SO^ = f (POF^, CU^, RES, PIC^) 3.11 
where SO = supply of o i l 
POF = foreign price of o i l after adjusting for export 
duties 
CU = capacity utilization in mills 
RES = dummy variable to represent the export restrictions 
d. Supply of d.c. 
The own price of the product, capacity utilization in the 
mills and export restrictions, as well as the price of nut inputs, are the 
factors assumed to influence the supply of d.c. This supply function for 
d.c. takes the following functional form: 
SDC = f (PDC , CU , RES, PFW ) 3.12 
L. L. ti 
where SDC = supply of d.c. 
PDC = price of d.c. after adjusting for export duties 
Others as defined earlier 
In general the capital equipment used in the above sub-sectors 
is 'fixed' in the short run, which tends to make at least short run supply 
relatively price inelastic. 
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The aggregate supply of coconuts is given by the following 
identity: 
ST = SND + SNP + SNF 3.13 
where ST = aggregate supply of coconuts 
Others as defined earlier 
1% 
3.1.3 Demand Functions 
a. Demand for Nuts. 
Similar to the supply, nuts are demanded by three distinct groups: 
domestic consumers, processors and fresh nut exporters. 
The demand for food nuts in the domestic market is assumed to be 
a function of retail price of food nuts, price of other major food items 
and disposable income of consumers. The same factors determine the demand 
for oil in the domestic market. Expressed algebraically the two demand 
functions can be written as: . - r,n •• w 
DND = f (PER , POP YD) 3.14 t "C ^ 
DOD = f (POR , POP , YD) 3.15 
where DND = domestic demand for food nuts 
PFR = retail price of food nuts n ' • 
POP - an index to represent the price of other major food items 
DOD = domestic demand for oil 
POR = retail price of oil --rr ' • 
YD = disposable income of consumers 
The price elasticities for demand for staple food items in general 
are usually inelastic. As reported by Richardson (1976), the price 
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elasticity of demand for food items in Australia varied between -0.53 to 
-0.22. The magnitudes of the price elasticity of demand for food items 
in a developing country are probably more elastic than in developed 
countries because of greater availability of siibstitutes. 
The processer demand for nuts would depend on the wholesale price 
of industrial nuts and prices of processed coconut products (i.e., copra, 
oil and d.c.), which is assumed to be of the following functional form: 
DNP = f (PPW , PCI , POF , PDC ) 3.16 
L- tr U U t 
where DNP = nuts demanded by the processing industries 
Others as defined earlier 
The short term fixity of capital resources in processing industries also 
could influence the nature of the elasticity of derived demand for nuts. 
Sri Lanka is a 'price taker' in the international market for fresh 
nuts. In purchasing nuts, foreign consumers would not only take into 
account the Sri Lankan prices but also prices of fresh nuts supplied by the 
other producers. The quantity purchased, however, depends on their 
disposable income. Hence, the demand function takes the following form: 
DNF^ = f (PNF^, PNS^, YF^) 3.17 
where DNF = export demand for fresh nuts 
PNS = price of substitutes 
YF = disposable income of importing countries 
Others as defined previously 
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b. Demand for Copra. 
Demand for industrial copra is a derived demand for oil, and 
considered to be a function of price of copra and foreign price of oil. 
This can be shown in the following functional form: 
DIC^ = f (PIC^, POF^) 3.18 
where DIG = demand for industrial copra 
Others as defined previously-
Export demand for edible copra is assumed to be mainly influenced 
by its own price and the disposable income of importing countries, and so 
takes the following functional form: 
DEC^ = f (PEC^, PS^, YF^) 3.19 
where DEC = demand for edible copra 
PS = price of substitutes 
Others as defined previously 
In the edible copra market Sri Lanka is a 'price maker'. 
c. Demand for Oil. 
The export demand for oil is assumed to be influenced by the foreign 
price of oil, price of soybean oil - the dominant oil in the lauric oils 
market - and disposable income in importing countries. This relationship 
can be written as: 
DOF = f (POF , PSOY , YF ) 3.20 
L U U U 
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where DOF = export demand for oil 
PSOY = international price of soybean oil 
Others as defined previously 
In the export market for coconut oil Sri Lanka is a 'price taker', 
d. Demand for d.c. 
The export demand for d.c. is assumed to be determined by the 
price of d.c. and disposable income of importing countries. (It is 
assumed there is no product differentiation between the Philippines' and 
Sri Lankan d.c.) The demand function hence takes the following functional 
form: 
DDC^ = f (PDC^, YF^) 3.21 
where DDC = demand for d.c. 
Others as defined previously 
Sri Lanka is assumed to be a 'price maker' in the international market for 
d. c. 
The aggregate demand for nuts has the following identity: 
DT^ = DND^ + DNP^ + DNF^ 3.22 
where DT = aggregate demand for nuts 
Others as defined previously 
The market is cleared when supply is equated with the demand: 
DT^ = ST^ 3.23 
47 
3.2 Previous Studies and A Priori Expectations of Price Elasticities 
3.2.1 Previous Studies 
Labys' (1973) study of the aggregate supply response of coconuts 
is the only published econometric study on the Sri Lankan coconut industry. 
In his study Labys' postulated annual production as a function of current 
and lagged prices and rainfall in the two previous periods. In the 
absence of reliable production data, the nut equivalent of exports was 
used as a proxy for quantity produced. The estimated price elasticity 
coefficient he obtained had a negative sign. Labys' function is actually 
an exportable surplus function rather than a supply function and the sign 
of the coefficient he derived is consistent with the expectations discussed 
in the previous section. 
Nyberg (1968) estimated for the Philippines the aggregate supply 
of coconuts and the demand for coconut products in the domestic and export 
markets for the period 1953-66. He treated separately the export market 
for oil, d.c., copra meal and the domestic market for food nuts and oil. 
The demand for lauric oils in the United States and European markets was 
postulated to be a function of the price of coconut oil, price of other 
edible oils and income of importing countries. The estimated demand 
functions for Philippines d.c. in the United States and copra meal in 
European markets provided no meaningful coefficients and due to the lack 
of data he was unable to estimate the domestic demand for food nuts and 
oil. The supply response revealed price elasticities of .3 and .6 in the 
short run and long run respectively. 
Librero (1971) estimated the aggregate domestic and foreign demand 
for three major Philippine coconut products - copra, copra meal and o i l -
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by using a nine - equations simultaneous system for the period 1950-67. 
In developing his model, physical and price relationships of copra, o i l 
and copra m e a l were explicitly considered in terms of four behavioural 
relationships: 
a. An export demand function for coconut oil which 
expressed the quantity of o i l exported as a function 
of price of oil, index of prices of soybean and 
cotton seed oil, price of palm kernel oil, income 
index of coconut oil importing countries and a dummy 
variable which takes into account the devaluation of 
the Peso in 1961. His direct price elasticity 
estimates ranged from -.814 to -1.278, very much 
higher than Nyberg's (1968) estimates of the demand 
elasticity for lauric oils which were -.22 to -.24 
in the United States and -.57 to -.79 for Europe 
for the period 1953-66. 
b. The export demand for copra was expressed as a 
function of price of copra, the price of palm kernel 
oil, the soybean supply in the United States, a 
time trend and a devaluation dummy variable. The 
resultant price elasticity ranged from -.387 to -.514 
implying a quite inelastic export demand for 
Philippine copra. 
c. The quantity of copra meal exported was postulated 
as a function of price of copra meal, price of soybean 
meal, livestock units of importing countries and a 
dummy variable for devaluation. The direct price 
49 
elasticity estimates varied between -.434 to -.627. 
d. The domestic o i l demanded was expressed as a function 
of price of coconut oil, real income and a dummy 
variable to represent the devaluation, which resulted 
in price elasticity estimates between -.302 to -.381. 
The other five equations consisted of technical relations between oil 
production, copra meal production, linkages between oil, meal and copra 
prices, and a market clearing equation for oil and copra meal. The demand 
m 
for d.c. did not enter into the system of equations but was subsequently 
estimated separately (Librero 1972), where the quantity demanded was 
expressed as a function of d.c. prices, an index of price of cereal and 
bakery products and confectionery sales in the United States, which revealed 
a highly inelastic price elasticity coefficient, (-0.045). 
3.2.2 A Priori Expectations of Price Elasticities 
The above theoretical model and previous studies enable one to 
formulate expectations as to the likely order of magnitudes of the price 
elasticities of interest. 
a. The price responsiveness of aggregate output in the 
coconut growing industry is likely to be highly 
inelastic in the short run, but less so in the long 
run. The responsiveness of marketed surplus is 
also therefore likely to be highly inelastic. 
b. The supply elasticities of food nuts, copra, oil 
and d.c. are likely to be less then perfectly elastic. 
c. The domestic demand elasticities for food nuts, copra 
and o i l are likely to be inelastic. 
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d . The foreign demand for fresh nuts and oil to be 
perfectly elastic since Sri Lanka is a price taker. 
e. The foreign demand elasticities for d.c. and edible 
copra are likely to be less than infinite and may 
even be inelastic. 
3.3 The Available Data and Attempts at Empirical Estimation of the Coconut 
Industry Model 
3.3.1 The Data 
The estimation of the price responsiveness of aggregate output of 
coconuts requires ideally annual time series data on acreage planted to 
coconut, bearing and harvested acreages, senile acreage, removals, share of 
production in the subsistence sector, prices received by the producers, 
volume of inputs used, rainfall in major producing areas and prices of 
associated crops and alternative crops. Data on the surplus marketed are 
the major additional requirements for the estimation of marketed supply 
response while to estimate the demand for fresh nuts and the demand for and 
supply of processed coconut products, time series data are required on sub-
sectoral production, domestic consumption, exports, prices of products at 
producer, wholesale, retail and international market levels, consumer 
incomes in domestic and export markets, and prices of substitutes in 
production and consumption. 
The time series data available in Sri Lanka falls far short of 
these requirements. It consists of annual estimated production, exports 
of coconut products, retail price of food nuts and o i l in the Colombo 
market, wholesale and Colombo f.o.b. prices of fresh nuts, copra, oil and 
d.c. and aggregate expenditure and volume of inputs issued under subsidy 
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schemes in the coconut industry. In addition to this, acreage'data on 
coconuts are available from the Censuses of 1946 and 1962, and per capita 
consiamption of food nuts and oil has been estimated from a number of 
Consumer Finance Surveys and the Socio-Economic Survey of 1969-70.^ 
The nut equivalent of the apparent domestic consumption of food 
nuts and oil - which is estimated as the product of average per capita 
cons\imption estimated from the above-mentioned surveys and an annual 
estimate of population - is added to the nut equivalent of the kernel 
product exports to obtain a production estimate, using fixed technical 
coefficients to convert coconut products to nut equivalents. 
The per capita consumption data available from cross-sectional 
surveys provide too little information on how consumers would respond to 
changes in price or income to be any use in estimating consumer demand 
curves for nuts and oil. And their unsatisfactory estimation in turn 
reduces markedly the usefulness of the nut, copra, and oil production data 
derived from them, especially as even the population data are only 
estimates from 10 yearly census data. Export data, however, are much more 
reliable, because records are kept for administrative piarposes at various 
points along the marketing channel. 
Although the food nuts and d.c. sub-sectors are conceptually 
independent from copra and oil, oil and thereby copra prices have a major 
influence on prices of fresh nuts and hence food nuts and d.c., because 
copra is the single major user of nuts accounting for almost half the 
coconuts produced in Sri Lanka. These price inter-relationships are 
1 See references in footnote on page 10 , 
TABLE 3.1 
CORRELATION MATRIX OF COCONUT PRODUCT PRICES 
Retail Price Wholesale Price Retail Price f.o.b. Price Wholesale Price f.o.b. Price 
of Coconuts of Coconuts of Oil of Oil of Copra of Copra 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Wholesale Price of Coconuts .84 
Retail Price of Oil .99 .82 
f.o.b. Price of Oil .97 .83 .98 
Wholesale Price of Copra .98 .83 .99 .98 
f.o.b. Price of Copra .88 .73 .86 .84 .86 
f.o.b. Price of d. c. .98 .73 .97 .95 .97 .86 
So\irce: (1) Statistical Abstract of Ceylon 
(2) Coconut Products Annual Review 
cn 
to 
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reflected in the high correlations among them, as is evident from Table 3.1. 
This gives rise to insurmountable multicollinearity problems in trying 
to estimate supply and domestic demand curves econometrically, 
3.3.2 Attempts at Empirical Estimation 
As a result of the dominant position that Sri Lanka holds in d.c. 
and edible copra markets, one would expect their prices to be influenced 
by the quantity supplied. This leads to the estimation of parameters in 
these two commodities through a multi-equational model. However, in the 
other sub-sectors, the prices are largely determined on the basis of the 
coconut o i l prices, and so are assumed to be exogenous to the system, so 
each equation has to be treated separately and so the single equation method 
is the appropriate estimation method. 
The data inadequacies prevent the estimation of most of the 
equations. The exceptions are the export demand for oil and the supply 
of and demand for both d.c. and fresh nuts in export markets. These are 
presented in Appendix 3.1, but are not sufficiently significant to be 
reliable. Hence, the policy analysis in subsequent chapters has to rely 
on a priori judgements about parameters. 
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APPENDIX 3.1 
a. Export supply and demand for fresh nuts: statistical models and results. 
Ig SNF = a^ + a^ Ig PNF + a^ Ig PFW + a^ Ig PPW + u 
Ig DNF = b^ + b^ Ig PNF + b^ Ig PNS + b^ Ig YF + u 
In the absence of data on the price of substitutes and disposable income in 
importing countries, only the foreign price of nuts was used as the 
explanatory variable in the demand equation. 
Ig SNF = 4.418 -0.690 Ig PNF -0.372 Ig FNP + 0.279 Ig PNP R^=0.36,d=l.8 
(2.4)** (0.9) (1.3) 
Ig DNF = 5.447 -0.735 Ig PNF R^=0.37,d=l.7 
* * 
(3.9) 
b. Export demand for oil: statistical model and results. 
Ig DOF = a^ + a^ Ig POF + a^ Ig PSOY + a^ YF + u 
The large number of trade partners involved and irregular pattern of their 
purchases prevented use of disposable income in this model. 
-2 
Ig DOF = 20.433 -1.515 Ig POF -0.870 Ig PSOY R =0.37,d=2.2 
(1.7)* (1.8)* 
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c. Demand and supply of d.c.: statistical model and results. 
Ig DDC = a^ + a^ Ig PDC + a^ Ig YF + u^ ^ 
Ig SDC = + Ig PDC + b^ Ig PFW + b^ Ig CU + b^ RES + u^ 
Ig DDC = Ig SDC 
Due to the non availability of data on capacity utilization this variable 
was deleted from the model. The United Kingdom being the major traditional 
trade partner for d.c. the disposable income was used to represent the 
income variable. 
Two stage least squares estimates: 
Ig DDC = 12.386 -0.489 Ig PDC + 0.224 Ig YF d = 1.1 
* * * * * * 
(10.1) (2.1) (2.3) 
Ig SDC = 106.893 -31.116 PDC + 16.386 Ig PFW + 16.080 RES d = 1.3 
(0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) 
** significant at the 1 per cent level 
* significant at the 5 per cent level 
The supply elasticity of food nuts and foreign demand elasticity for d.c. 
is consistent with a priori expectations but not foreign demand elasticities 
for fresh nuts and oil. All the coefficients in the supply equation for 
d.c. is insignificant. 
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CHAPTER 4 
AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF CURRENT MARKET INTERVENTION 
In this chapter, the major forms of government intervention in 
the S r i Lankan coconut industry markets are analysed. After outlining 
the apparent objectives of these policies in the first section, the 
second section points out the effects on production, consumption, trade, 
government revenue, income distribution and potential national economic 
welfare of the policy instruments currently used to pursue these 
objectives. The instrxaments are grouped according to whether or not 
their direct effect is to influence domestic prices or quantities of goods 
traded internationally. 
4.1 Objectives of Government Intervention 
The objectives of government intervention in the coconut industry 
markets are not explicitly stated, but information available in various 
documents enables one to collate and order them, on the basis of their 
importance. The Ten Year Plan (1959) and the Five Year Plan (1971) 
attempted to maintain the traditional level of domestic consumption (125 
nuts per annum per person) while maintaining normal levels of coconut and 
processed coconut product exports by accelerating coconut production and 
productivity. A large number of schemes have been designed to expand 
coconut production through subsidized inputs such as fertilizer and 
outright financial grants to undertake activities such as rehabilitation, 
replanting, new planting and intercropping. The number of assistance 
schemes in the coconut industry increased during the 1970s and the 
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government financial outlay increased by six times (doubled in real terms) 
during the period 1956-75. Thus boosting production and productivity can 
be considered as the most important objective of government intervention 
in the coconut industry. 
The decline in 1973 in the coconut crop led to difficulties in 
maintaining both the traditional level of domestic consumption in nuts 
and oil and the average level of kernel product exports. So with the 
objective of maintaining the former, the government banned exports of 
nuts, copra and oil. With a subsequent improvement in coconut production, 
limited quantities of kernel product exports were resumed. Then the 
record low coconut crop of 1977 brought not only a reimposition of the ban 
on nuts, copra and oil exports but also, for the first time, restrictions 
on the production and export of d.c. This suggests that the objective 
of maintaining domestic consumption has precedence over the objective of 
expanding export sales and thereby being able to boost government revenue 
via export taxes. 
During the period 1948-52, on average 60 per cent of government 
revenue was collected through customs duties which consist of export and 
import taxes.^ However, as is evident from Table 4.1, the importance of 
custom revenue has steadily declined. During the period 1973-77, it 
accounted for only 16 per cent of government revenue.^ The export duties 
levied on coconuts and processed coconut products, listed in Section 2.7.2, 
For an exposition of the various objectives to which the collection of 
export duties is directed see Corden (1974, pp.55-87) and Levin 
(1960, pp.263-64). 
This decline is an indication of the increasing ease of collecting 
government revenue from other sources. Such a decline is common 
in the process of economic development as noted by Lewis (1963). 
TABLE 4 .1 
CUSTOM REVENUE AS A PER CENT OF TOTAL 
GOVERNMENT REVENUE, 1948-77 
(In Rs '000) 
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Period 
(1) 
Total 
Government 
Revenue 
(2) 
Total 
Customs 
Revenue 
(3) 
Export 
Duties 
(4) 
Import 3 as a 
Duties Per ceni 
of 2 
(5) (6) 
1948 540,605 313,299 144,690 174,239 59 
1949 576,063 333,235 150,051 182,818 58 
1950 623,283 381,491 187,387 193,736 61 
1951 835,945 551,030 295,439 255,362 66 
1952 875,306 451,778 192,066 259,454 52 
1953 871,361 443,782 207,899 251,827 51 
1954 941,048 503,256 284,414 255,074 53 
1955 1 ,068 ,458 628,938 375,879 260,784 59 
1956 1 ,168,537 608,375 305,656 293,923 52 
1957 1 ,158,676 627,494 320,185 292,438 54 
1958 1 ,186,462 616,975 348,547 309,232 52 
1959 1 ,225,232 653,615 271,928 380,980 53 
1960 1 ,293,578 620,143 218,612 406,830 48 
1961 1 ,402,183 658,566 223,469 434,643 47 
1962 1 ,507 ,618 682,513 221,929 459,354 45 
1963 1,451,535 609,158 214,219 394,197 42 
1964 1 ,619 ,986 683,914 215,282 467,789 . 42 
1965 1 ,675,612 673,467 251,509 407,906 40 
1966 1 ,726 ,901 682,678 197,718 503,515 40 
1967 1 ,796 ,810 692,690 196,732 455,937 39 
1968 1 ,952,517 753,633 283,259 469,696 39 
1969 2 ,535,997 720,439 298,879 420,244 28 
1970 2 ,736 ,670 578,819 313,667 263,471 21 
1971 2 ,817,712 541,599 261,195 278,521 19 
1972 4 ,125 ,576 484,907 230,198 251,263 12 
1973 4 ,034 ,000 608,400 386,400 222,000 15 
1974 4 ,786,700 937,400 660,100 277,300 20 
1975 5 ,083,500 765,800 429,900 335,900 15 
1976 5 ,739,000 896,700 420,800 475,900 16 
1977 6 ,686 ,000 1 ,137,800 620,000 517,800 17 
Source: (1) 
(2) 
Statistical Abstract of 
Central Bank of Ceylon, 
Ceylon, 1947 
Annual Review 
to 1975 
, 1976 and 1977 
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are an important contribution to customs revenue. The third objective of 
government intervention might therefore be to boost export tax receipts. 
If producers are to be induced to expand production the government 
apparently believes there is a need to reduce the risk of abnormally low 
prices and this might be considered its fourth major objective of 
intervention. The so-called price stabilization scheme, introduced in 
1972, attempts to do this by guaranteeing oil produced for exports. 
The apparent major objectives of government intervention in the 
industry can thus be ranked as: (i) increasing coconut production and 
productivity; (ii) maintaining domestic consumption; (iii) raising export 
tax revenue; and (iv) reducing the risk of low oil prices. 
4.2 The Effects of Intervention 
4.2.1 Domestic Price Intervention 
Domestic intervention to boost coconut production and productivity 
has taken the form of production and input subsidies. Figure 4.1 shows 
the effects of a price subsidy for coconuts in the coconut growing industry, 
where the supply (SS) is less than perfectly elastic and the demand (DD) 
is perfectly elastic, 
A price subsidy at the rate of EE'/OE has the following effects: 
(i) Production effects: Induced by increased producer price, OE', 
production expands by AA' from OA to OA' and producer's surplus expands by 
EE'IG. (ii) Consumption effect: Although producer price is OE', the 
consumers continue to pay the pre-subsidy price OE, without changing the 
volume of consumption OB. (iii) Balance of payment effect: Due to the 
unchanged consumption, the entire increased production becomes an exportable 
surplus, with a potential export revenue increase of AGHA', thus improving 
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FIGURE 4.1 
THE EFFECTS OF A SUBSIDY ON A COMMODITY WHERE 
THE FOREIGN ELASTICITY OF DEMAND IS GREATER THAN 
THE ELASTICITY OF DOMESTIC SUPPLY 
Price 
E' 
D 
l\ 1 1 1 
1 1 
^ ^ 1 
\ ^ i ^ \ J 
H 
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the balance of payments of the country. (iv) Government revenue effect: 
A subsidy at the rate of EE'/OE requires a government revenue outlay equal 
to area EE'IH. (v) Redistribution effect: A subsidy expands production, 
increases producer's welfare and exportable surplus but at the expense of 
government revenue. Consumers are neither better off nor worse off due 
to the subsidy. (vi) Welfare effects: However, the subsidy increases 
the cost of production and leads to a net welfare loss equal to the 
difference between what the government pays out (EE'IH) and what producers 
receive (EE'IG) namely, area IGH. 
The lower the elasticity of supply, the less the production effect 
and the greater the per unit subsidy required to boost production and 
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export a given amount. This became evident if AM is treated as the 
industry supply curve, (completely inelastic). 
Under the so-called price stabilization scheme, when oil prices 
are below the specified floor prices, oil sold to the CMB receives a 
price above the prevailing market price. Hence this scheme is equivalent 
to a price subsidy during low price periods, and so has effects similar 
to those described above. 
The input price subsidy on fertilizer is different in that it 
involves a foreign exchange cost. Figure 4.2 shows the foreign exchange 
effects of the coconut fertilizer subsidy. 
FIGURE 4.2 
FERTILIZER DEMAND IN RELATION TO THE SUBSIDY 
Price 
Quantity 
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In Figure 4.2 the demand for fertilizer by the coconut growing 
industry is shown by DD, the supply by SS and the international price by 
OP. A 50 per cent price subsidy on fertilizer reduces the domestic 
price to Ps and as a result, the demand for fertilizer in the coconut 
sector expands by AE and the foreign exchange cost of the subsidy to the 
government amounts to PsPLH. 
If the fertilizer subsidy were to lower the supply curve in 
Figure 4.1 to S'S', then the net effect on foreign exchange earnings from 
increased exports due to a fertilizer subsidy amounts to AGHA' less PsPLH, 
which may be equal to, greater than or less than zero. The foreign 
exchange cost of the fertilizer subsidy would be higher, the greater the 
elasticity of demand for fertilizer. This derived demand in turn would 
be greater, the more elastic the demand for the final product (Stigler 1954). 
4.2.2 Trade Intervention 
Bans or restrictions on kernel product exports and export duties 
on coconuts and processed coconut products are considered as trade inter-
vention. In this section the effects of export duties, restrictions on 
d.c. exports and export bans on fresh nuts, copra and oil are analysed 
taking into account the likely demand elasticities. 
a. Effects of an export duty levied by a 'price taker'. 
For fresh nuts, industrial copra and oil, where the foreign demand 
is assumed to be perfectly elastic, Sri Lanka is a 'price taker' and can 
not pass the duty burden on to consumers in importing countries. In 
effect producers bear the burden of the duty, as illustrated in Figure 4.3. 
Figure 4.3 is drawn on the assumption that the domestic supply (SS) 
and demand (DD) are less elastic than the perfectly elastic foreign demand (EE) 
63 
FIGURE 4.3 
THE EFFECTS OF AN EXPORT DUTY ON A COMMODITY WHERE 
THE FOREIGN ELASTICITY OF DEMAND IS GREATER THAN THE 
ELASTICITY OF DOMESTIC SUPPLY Price 
Quantity 
B B' A' A 
An export duty at the rate of EE'/OE' reduces the price received by 
producers by the amount EE', generating the following effects: (i) Production 
effect: Production contracts by AA' from OA to OA' and the producer's 
surplus by E'EKI. (ii) Consumption effect: Induced by the reduction in 
domestic price, domestic consumption increases by BB' and consumer 
surplus by E'EDH. (iii) Balance of payments effect: The pre-duty volume 
of exports BA reduces to B'A', resulting in a reduction equal to A'JKA + 
BDGB' in export earnings, which is unfavourable to the country's balance 
of payments. (iv) Government revenue effect: An export duty at the rate 
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of EE'/OE' on the export volume B'A' brings a revenue equal to HGJI to 
the government. (v) Redistribution effect: The domestic consumers 
acquire welfare gains from an export duty, at the expense of owners of and-
factors of production specific to the duty levied industry. (vi) Welfare 
effect: The country as a whole incurs a net welfare loss equal to the 
difference between the welfare losses to the producers (E'EKI) and the 
gains to the consumers (E'EDH) and to the government (HGJI), namely, the 
areas HDG and IJK. 
b. Effects of an export duty levied by a 'price maker'. 
As mentioned earlier, Sri Lanka is probably a 'price maker' in the 
world d.c. and.edible copra markets. Supply restrictions of d.c. have a 
similar effect to that of an export duty, with the exception that the 
former do not raise government revenue. The incidence of an export duty 
levied on a product with a less than perfectly elastic foreign demand is 
spread between domestic producers and foreign consumers. The burden of 
the duty on the latter would be more, the lower the elasticity of demand 
relative to that of supply. In Figure 4.4 the effects of an export duty 
at the rate of E'E"/OE' are illustrated graphically for a commodity where 
the entire production is exported. In this figure, both demand (DD) and 
supply (SS) elasticities are assumed to be less than infinite. 
(i) Production effect: Production contracts by AA' from OA to 
OA' reducing producer surplus by E'EPR. (ii) Consumption effect: Since 
the entire production is exported, foreign consumption contracts by an 
equal amount to that of production, resulting in a loss in foreign consumers 
surplus equal to EE"QP. (iii) Balance of payment effect: An export duty 
at the rate of E'E"/OE' reduces the export volume by AA', but increases 
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FIGURE 4.4 
THE EFFECTS OF AN EXPORT DUTY ON A COMMODITY WHERE 
BOTH DEMAND AND SUPPLY ELASTICITIES ARE LESS THAN 
PERFECTLY ELASTIC 
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the foreign price to OE" , so the post-duty export earnings amount to OE"QA', 
which is greater than (or equal to or less than) the pre-duty earnings 
OEPA if the (negative of the) foreign demand elasticity is less than (or 
equal to, or greater than) unity. (iv) Government revenue effect: The 
(government revenue from the export duty amounts to E'E"QR which consists 
of foreign consumer's contribution (EE"QN) and domestic producer's con-
tribution (E'ENR). (v) Redistribution effect: The government gains from 
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the duty revenue at the expense of domestic producers and foreign 
consumers. (vi) Welfare effects: The losses by both foreign consumers 
(EE"QP) and domestic producers (E'EPR) are greater than the revenue 
gain to the government (E'E"QR), so the export duty reduces world welfare 
by an area equal to RQP. The exporting country gains only if EE"QN is 
greater than NPR, which is less likely, the more elastic the foreign 
demand curve. 
c. Effects of an export ban. 
Fresh nuts, copra and oil exports have been banned in periods of 
low coconut production. An export ban is similar to a prohibitive rate 
of export duty. Figure 4.5 shows the effects of an export ban on a 
commodity where the foreign elasticity of demand is greater than the 
elasticity of domestic supply. 
FIGURE 4.5 
THE EFFECT OF AN EXPORT BAN ON A COMMODITY WHERE THE 
FOREIGN ELASTICITY OF DEMAND IS GREATER THAN THE ELASTICITY 
OF DOMESTIC SUPPLY Price 
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An export ban is synonymous to a duty at the rate of E'E/OE' in 
the above figure and has the following effects: (i) Production effect: 
Production contracts to OA' reducing the producers surplus by E'ECG. 
(ii) Consumption effect: The reduction in price expands the domestic 
consumption to OA' increasing the consumer surplus by E'EB'G. (iii) Balance 
of payments effect: The entire production being consumed domestically, 
the commodity is not internationally traded, thus harmful to the balance 
of payments of the country. (iv) Government revenue effect: The government 
no longer collects any duty revenue from exports due to the absence of 
exports. (v) Redistribution effect: Domestic consumers increase their 
welfare at the expense of producers. (vi) Welfare effects: Since the 
loss in producers' surplus is greater than the gains in consumers' surplus, 
the country as a whole incurs a loss equal to area GB'C. 
d. Effects of Sri Lankan d.c. trade policies on the Philippines. 
Sri Lankan trade policies on d.c. have repercussions on her 
competitors especially the Philippines. Figure 4.6 shows the effects of 
Sri Lankan trade policies on the Philippines' d.c. trade. The figure is 
drawn on the assumption that demand and supply elasticities in both 
countries are less than perfectly elastic. 
The d.c. exported by Sri Lanka and the Philippines is shown by 
Ssl and Sph respectively and the horizontal aggregation of individual 
country export curves gives the world d.c. supply curve S^. The world 
demand curve is DD. Under unrestricted trade Sri Lanka exports OQ^^ and 
the Philippines OQ^^ which horizontally adds up to OQ^ the world d.c. 
supply and the equilibrium price is OP. If Sri Lanka reduces her exports 
to through supply restrictions, then her supply curve in effect 
FIGURE 4.6 
THE EFFECTS OF SRI LANKAN D.C. TRADE POLICIES ON 
THE PHILIPPINES 
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Price (World) 
Quantity (World) 
Q' Q 
take the form of Q^^AB. (An ad valorem duty at the rate of P'P"/OP' 
would shift the supply curve to S'^^.) This would result in the world 
supply curve taking the form of S^CO, reducing the equilibrium quantity 
to OQ' and raising the price to OP". The reduction in d.c. exports 
w 
change the Sri Lankan export earnings from OPDQ^^ to OP"CQ^^. The latter 
can be equal to, greater than or less than the former and the gains or 
losses from export restrictions depend on the nature of this difference. 
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In contrast the Philippines increases her export earnings from OPFQ ^ 
to and acquires net welfare benefits on account of Sri Lankan 
d.c. trade policy. However, the reduction in world d.c. trade results 
in a net welfare loss equal to area QRS. 
The data in Table 4.2 shows that induced by increased prices, 
the Philippines more than filled the gap created by Sri Lanka in expanding 
the volume of its d.c. exports. However, in real terms, the rate of 
growth in the world d.c. trade, which averaged 8 per cent during the period 
1970-75, dropped to only 3 per cent in 1977 and 2 per cent in 1978, which 
is consistent with the expectation of reduced world trade. 
TABLE 4.2 
VOLUME EXPORTED AND INTERNATIONAL 
PRICES OF D.C.: 1970-78 
Period Sri Lanka Philippines 
Volume London Volume London 
Exported Market Exported Market 
in '000 Price in '000 Price 
MT US$/MT MT US$/MT 
Total Rate of 
- Volume Growth 
of Trade in 
in '000 Export 
MT Volume 
1970 54. 9 n.a. 61.0 n.a. 115.9 
1975 59.3 546 66.3 575 125.6 8 
1976 45.4 739 81.4 765 126.8 
1977 31.6 1231 98.6 1192 130.2 3 
1978 40.7 1214 91.5 1172 132.2 2 
Note: n .a. = not available. 
Source: Coconut Product Annual Review, 1975-78. 
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e. Effects of price fluctuations and trade policies on exporter's 
marketing margins. 
Export duties on coconut products in general appear to have given 
an opportunity for exporters to make super-normal profits. In Tables 4.3 
to 4.6, the domestic^ and f.o.b. prices of fresh nuts, copra, oil and d.c. 
are shown respectively. Under the assumption of a backward shift in the 
entire export duty, one would expect producers to receive the world price 
less the duty and exporters margins. If 'normal exporters' margins is 
that prevailing in periods Of duty free exports, then Tables 4.3 to 4.5 
reveal larger than normal margins (net of duty) in times when export duties 
are imposed. The information in Table 4.6 does not help in understanding 
whether or not the export duty on d.c. was shifted forward to the foreign 
consumers to some extent, but the difference between f.o.b. and local 
market prices clearly shows a backward shift of more than the entire export 
duty. It thus appears that exporters pass the duty to both consumers and 
producers, in an attempt to acquire super-normal profits at the expense of 
producers in times of high prices and export duties. 
To understand the nature of exporters' marketing margins, the 
relationship between annual margins and f.o.b. prices (of fresh nuts, copra, 
oil and d.c., for the period 1948-78) were statistically analysed by using 
a regression technique. The preliminary analysis indicated a linear 
relationship in copra margins while the other three products were of non 
linear form, and quadratic functions were used for estimation. The results 
1 In the absence of producer prices, Colombo market prices of coconut 
products are used. 
TABLE 4.3 
COPRA PRICES AND EXPORT DUTIES, 1948-78 
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Period Rate of f.o.b. Price Duty Local Market 3-5 Volume 
Duty % Rs/MT Rs/MT Price, Rs/MT Exported 
MT 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
1948 28 762 213 531 231 55 ,535 
1949 26 984 256 592 392 24,970 
1950 24 1,186 285 826 360 21,456 
1951 25 1,377 344 963 409 19,657 
1952 21 802 168 611 191 41,385 
1953 22 1,052 231 740 312 21,733 
1954 26 972 257 712 260 46,764 
1955 •23 736 169 574 162 69,451 
1956 21 831 175 627 204 58,653 
1957 19 938 178 709 229 35,322 
1958 17 1,031 175 826 205 28,145 
1959 18 1,185 213 939 246 43,293 
1960 20 1,093 219 749 290 29,600 
1961 24 856 205 556 300 55,870 
1962 22 802 176 588 214 73,544 
1963 24 897 215 665 232 43,767 
1964 24 934 224 661 273 59,014 
1965 25 1,166 292 804 362 41,603 
1966 19 1,160 220 772 388 21,204 
1967 22 1,160 255 781 379 16,056 
1968 27 1,560 421 1,009 559 21,604 
1969 25 1,344 336 936 408 19,356 
1970 23 1,464 337 975 489 15,520 
1971 34 1,377 468 839 538 17,497 
1972 16 1,167 187 774 393 44 ,259 
1973 n.a. 1,350 n.a. 1,270 80 2,784 
1974 n.a. 2,230 n.a. 2,224 6 406 
1975 n.a. 4,760 n.a. 1,150 3,610 1,414 
1st Quarter n.a. 5,510 n.a. 1,410 4,100 330 
2nd Quarter n.a. 4,170 n.a. 1,090 3,080 178 
3rd Quarter n.a. 5,520 n.a. 970 4,550 177 
4th Quarter - 4,600 - 1,120 2,770 729 
1976 - 5,480 - 1,830 3,650 1,227 
1st Quarter - 5,180 - 1,520 3 ,660 259 
2nd Quarter - 5,460 - 1,630 3,430 190 
3rd Quarter - 5,620 - 2,030 3,590 463 
4th Quarter - 5,600 - 2,110 3,490 365 
1977 - 7,910 - 3,410 4,500 275 
1st Quarter - 5,870 - 3,380 2,490 150 
2nd Quarter - - - 4,260 — — 
3rd Quarter - - - 2,980 — 
4th Quarter - 10,340 - 3,180 7,160 126 
1978 
1st Quarter - 10,570 - 3,170 7,400 380 
2nd Quarter - 10,300 - 3,340 6,960 165 
3rd Quarter 55 10,200 5,580 3,330 6,870 329 
n.a. = not available 
= no export duty 
Source: (1) Coconut Statistics of Sri Lanka, 1945-73 
(2) Central Bank of Ceylon, Bulletin 
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TABLE 4.4 
OIL PRICES AND EXPORT DUTIES, 1948-78 
Period Rate of f.o.b. Price Duty Local Market 3-5 Volume 
Duty % Rs/MT Rs/MT Price, Rs/MT Rs/MT Exported 
M T 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
1948 16 1,092 175 1,006 86 76,946 
1949 17 1,339 228 1,006 333 90,616 
1950 15 1,656 248 1,379 277 76,933 
1951 14 2,036 285 1,591 445 111,545 
1952 11 1,227 135 960 267 108,426 
1953 13 1,495 194 1,259 236 95,070 
1954 14 1,431 200 1,110 321 70,023 
1955 12 1,147 138 932 215 98,787 
1956 11 1,150 127 966 184 86,284 
1957 10 1,236 124 1,086 150 54,941 
1958 10 1,374 137 1,205 169 45,048 
1959 9 1,662 150 1,469 193 70,575 
1960 13 1,414 184 1,135 279 56,913 
1961 13 1,145 149 874 271 93,308 
1962 13 1,082 141 883 199 104,007 
1963 13 1,202 156 1,019 183 82,367 
1964 14 1,288 180 1,074 214 119,447 
1965 18 1,636 294 1,253 383 88,293 
1966 12 1,474 177 1,143 331 74,037 
1967 13 1,293 168 1,138 155 67,779 
1968 25 2,075 519 1,492 583 64,078 
1969 18 1,924 346 1,435 489 56,061 
1970 23 2,005 461 1,487 518 57,880 
1971 19 2,109 401 1,386 723 70,545 
1972 9 1,524 137 1,117 407 86,822 
1973 n.a. 1,465 n.a. 2,000 -535 18,350 
1974 n.a. 6,687 n.a. 3,724 2,963 21,845 
1975 n.a. 3,440 n.a. 2,040 1,400 54,472 
1st Quarter n.a. 6,790 n.a. 2,380 4,410 8,677 
2nd Quarter n.a. 3,690 n.a. 1,980 1,710 16,910 
3rd Quarter n.a. 2,610 n.a. 1,820 790 10,325 
4th Quarter - 2,960 - 2,010 950 18,557 
1976 - 3,100 - 2,910 190 60,608 
1st Quarter - 2,640 - 2,400 240 18,227 
2nd Quarter - 3,050 - 2,560 490 14,030 
3rd Quarter - 3,080 - 3,310 -230 15,412 
4th Quarter - 4,030 - 3,360 670 12,939 
1977 - 4,400 - 5,640 -1,240 9,108 
1st Quarter - 3 ,890 - 5,110 -1,220 8,248 
2nd Quarter - 5,100 - 6,920 -1,820 796 
3rd Quarter - - - 5,320 — — 
4th Quarter - 17,100 - 5,240 11,860 63 
1978 
1st Quarter - 9,970 - 5,000 4,970 5,770 
2nd Quarter - 9,730 - 5,170 4,560 6,631 
3rd Quarter 20 8,680 1,750 5,380 3,300 5,863 
n.a. = not available 
= no export duty 
Source: (1) Coconut Statistics of Sri Lanka, 1945-73 
(2) Central Bank of Ceylon, Bulletin 
TABLE 4.5 
FRESH COCONUT PRICES AND EXPORT DUTIES, 1948-1976 
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Period Rate of f.o.b. Price Duty Rs Local Market 3-5 Volume 
Duty % Rs per 1000 per 1000 Price Rs per Rs per Exported 
nuts nuts 1000 nuts 1000 in 1000 
nuts nuts 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
1948 66 208 137 135 73 9,387 
1949 70 355 249 143 212 12,897 
1950 23 469 108 400 69 8,632 
1951 19 456 87 414 42 6,621 
1952 11 381 42 327 54 7,868 
1953 19 415 79 255 160 6,570 
1954 19 336 64 207 129 9,170 
1955 25 270 68 108 162 10,918 
1956 25 250 63 144 106 11,047 
1957 30 270 81 175 95 11,549 
1958 - - - 148 - -
1959 - - - 171 - -
1960 - - - 132 - -
1961 31 260 81 123 137 5,602 
1962 26 280 73 128 152 6,514 
1963 17 320 54 164 156 8,706 ^  
1964 21 290 61 166 124 7,797 
1965 24 340 82 214 126 8,643 
1966 18 310 56 213 97 11,346 
1967 20 300 60 203 97 10,227 
1968 23 440 101 257 183 7,583 
1969 21 410 86 230 180 10,332 
1970 21 460 97 245 215 6,321 
1971 19 450 86 244 206 8,566 
1972 11 410 45 238 172 10,561 
1973 n.a. 680 n.a. 226 454 5,118 
1974 n.a. 1,549 n.a. 445 1,104 1,966 
1975 n.a. 973 n.a. 208 765 9,525 
1976 - 1,075 - 535 540 7,232 
Note: n.a. not available 
no export duty 
Source: (1) Coconut Statistics of Sri Lanka, 1945-73 
(2) Central Bank of Ceylon, Bulletin 
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TABLE 4.6 
D.C. PRICES AND EXPORT DUTIES, 1948-78 
Period Rate of f. o.b. Price Duty Local Market 3-5 Volume 
Duty % Rs/MT Rs/MT Price, Rs/MT Rs/MT Exported 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
rli 
(7) 
1948 23 2,110 485 1,460 650 12,105 
1949 27 1,610 435 1,120 490 15,853 
1950 12 2,090 251 1,830 260 45,630 
1951 14 1,630 228 1,340 290 40,410 
1952 9 1,160 104 970 190 56,515 
1953 12 1,350 •162 1,170 180 58,190 
1954 13 1,180 153 990 190 56,090 
1955 11 930 102 770 160 58,793 
1956 10 1,000 100 900 100 64,768 
1957 8 1,100 88 950 150 49,684 
1958 7 1,250 88 1,120 130 57,648 
1959 8 1,410 113 1,230 180 53,333 
1960 10 1,290 129 1,010 280 55,314 
1961 11 970 107 750 220 49,123 
1962 9 1,130 102 940 190 49,817 
1963 12 1,220 146 950 270 49,136 
1964 14 1,180 165 880 300 54,844 
1965 17 1,560 265 1,150 410 52,873 
1966 11 1,320 145 1,030 290 47,281 
1967 13 1,290 168 1,080 210 47,024 
1968 20 2,330 466 1,750 580 70,209 
1969 17 1,690 287 1,280 410 51,738 
1970 20 2,190 438 1,410 780 49,121 
1971 16 1,950 312 1,230 720 52,998 
1972 6 1,610 97 1,340 270 49,426 
1973 n.a. 2,950 n.a. 1,980 970 37,741 
1974 n.a. 6,170 n.a. 3,130 3,040 42,563 
1975 n.a. 3,250 n.a. 1,930 1,320 59,307 
1st Quarter n.a. 5,290 n.a. 2,070 3,220 10,313 
2nd Quarter n.a. 3,370 n.a. 1,600 1,770 12,308 
3rd Quarter n.a. 3,060 n.a. 1,980 1,080 15,989 
4th Quarter - 2,060 - 2,070 - 20,701 
1976 - 3,910 - 3,240 670 45,988 
1st Quarter - 2,980 - 2,370 610 9,855 
2nd Quarter - 3,090 - 2,440 650 11,083 
3rd Quarter - 3,610 - 3,020 590 15,058 
4th Quarter - 6,270 - 5,140 1,130 9,991 
1977 - 9,620 - 5,910 3,710 30,400 
1st Quarter - 8,690 - 6,710 1,980 8,316 
2nd Quarter - 8,570 - 5,610 2,960 5,427 
3rd Quarter - 8,620 - 5,380 3,240 6,986 
4th Quarter - 11,780 - 5,850 5,930 9,671 
1978 
1st Quarter - 16,880 - 5,410 11,470 7,458 
2nd Quarter - 15,770 - 5,170 10,600 7,046 
3rd Quarter 43 15,870 6,750 5,650 10,170 12,894 
n.a. = not available 
= No export duty 
Source: (1) Coconut Statistics of Sri Lanka, 1945-73 
(2) Central Bank of Ceylon, Bulletin 
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of this analysis are given in Table 4.7, which shows that marketing margins 
in all the products concerned are positively related to f.o.b. prices. 
It therefore appears that exporters follow a pricing policy of making 
relatively large marketing margins in periods of high prices and lower 
margins when there are low f.o.b. prices. 
TABLE 4.7 
REGRESSION RESULTS OF EXPORTERS 
MARKETING MARGINS 
Regression R^ 
COT-l = 473.489 + 0.706 COP 0.96 
(28.0)** 
OIM = -189.956 + 0.279 OIP + 0.0000219 OIP^ 0.97 
(2.9)** (2.2)* 
DCM = 9.171 + 0.169 DCP + 0.0000312 DCP^ 0.98 
(2.8)** (10.0)** 
NUM = -5.614 + 0.333 NUP + 0.000257 NUP 0.91 
(3.2)** (3.7)* 
** significant at 99 per cent level. 
* significant at 97 per cent level. 
where COM = Margins from copra exports DCM = Margins from d.c. exports 
COP = f.o.b. price of copra DCP = f.o.b. price of d.c. 
OIM = Margins from oil exports NUM = Margins from nut exports 
OIP = f.o.b. price of oil NUP = f.o.b. price of nuts 
Table 4.5 also shows negative marketing margins (losses) for the 
period 1973 and four quarters in 1976 and 1977 from oil exports.^ In 
The export data in Table 4.5 are inconsistent with CMB figures. 
According to CMB the oil exports in 1973 and 1977 amounted to 9884 MT 
and 2167 MT respectively as against 18,350 MT and 9108 MT reported by 
the Central Bank. The export volume reported by CMB, which refers 
to the actual quantities registered for export, are considered as more 
accurate. 
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1973, under the price stabilization scheme, o i l was purchased from 
domestic producers above the prevailing market p r i c e , and the CMB exported 
it, at a loss. The fall in the coconut crop since the 3rd quarter of 
1976 led to a drop in o i l production. The domestic o i l price increased 
above the world prices and small quantities were exported at a loss in 
domestic currency terms. 
4.3 Export Duties and Subsidies 
Figure 4.7, which is drawn on the same assumptions as those for 
Figure 4.1, shows the interacting effects of subsidies and export duties 
on the coconut industry. During the period 1960-72, the direct expenditure 
on subsidies amounted to about a third of the revenue collected from export 
duties on kernel products. 
FIGURE 4.7 
THE COMBINED EFFECTS OF SUBSIDIES AND EXPORT DUTIES 
ON COCONUTS 
Price 
Quantity 
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The role of subsidy (ES'/OE) amounts to only a third of the 
export duty { OD/DE ). (i) Production effect: The subsidy enables to 
increase the production from OA to OA* while the export duty then reduces 
it to OA" and the increase in production due to the subsidy is insufficient 
to compensate the production losses incurred from the duty. (ii) 
Consumption effect: The domestic consumption remains unchanged at OB with 
the subsidy and then increases to OB' as a result of the duty. (iii) 
Balance of payment effect: The subsidy increases the export volume by AA' 
and the export earnings by AJYA', while the duty then reduces the export 
volume by A"A and export earnings by BVSB' + A"NJA', deteriorating the 
country's balance of payment. (iv) Government revenue effect: An export 
duty at the rate of OD/DE boosts the government revenue by an area equal 
to TSNM, while a subsidy at the rate of ES'/OE requires a government revenue 
outlay equal to area ES'XY. (v) Redistribution effect: The subsidy 
enables an increase in production, producers' surplus and export earnings, 
at a cost to the government. The domestic consumers acquire welfare gain 
from an export duty at the expense of producers. (vi) Welfare effects: 
The losses being greater than the potential gains, the country as a whole 
incur a net welfare loss as a result of both subsidies and export duties 
(producers lose LEJK, consumers gain only ED'TV and the government gains 
TSNM - DLKM the net loss being VST + NKJ) • 
4.4 Summary 
Government intervention in the Sri Lankan coconut industry market 
can be broadly grouped as either domestic or trade policy. The domestic 
policies have taken the form of input and production subsidies while trade 
policies are mainly export duties. The effects of these two types of 
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policy have been analysed, within a partial equilibrium framework on the 
basis of assumed elasticities. The subsidies are primarily directed 
towards the coconut growing industry and induce production to increase, 
however, at a social cost. In general, especially if Sri Lanka is a 
'price taker', export duties are detrimental to production and exports, 
and hence to export earnings and the country's balance of payments. 
However, if the foreign elasticity of demand is less than unity, an export 
duty would improve the country's welfare through improved terms of trade, 
but not so when the elasticity is above unity. Export bans prevent the 
opportunities for international trade and reduce the welfare of both the 
exporting country and the world. The pricing policy adopted by 
exporters appears to have further reduced the welfare of producers. If 
the entire duty revenue were to be injected back to the industry in the 
form of subsidies, it is possible that the production disincentives 
arising from export duties would be partly offset by improved incentives 
from subsidies, hence the industry might well operate at close to free 
market levels. But since the subsidies being paid appear to be less than 
the export tax revenue collected, the coconut industry as a whole is likely 
to be smaller than could be the case without government intervention. 
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CHAPTER 5 
TOWARDS MORE RATIONAL INTERVENTION POLICIES 
The first part of this chapter re-emphasizes the social cost of 
intervention in the Sri Lankan coconut industry market and shows the 
economic superiority of the free market. This is followed by an analytical 
discussion of more rational intervention policies which can achieve more 
efficiently the apparent objectives of the government, 
5.1 The Superiority of Free Markets 
It is clear from the analysis in Chapter 4 that any market 
intervention by government reduces potential economic welfare. A subsidy 
« 
for example favours resources specific to the subsidized industry, attracts 
additional resources to the industry, and thereby reduces the efficiency 
of use of the nations productive resources. An export duty in general 
redistributes part of the producers' surplus among domestic consumers, but 
the total loss to the producers is higher than the benefits to consumers, 
so that there is a net welfare loss to the society. The more elastic the 
foreign demand, the greater the welfare loss (Figures 4.3 and 4.4). Export 
bans are in effect an extreme form of export tax and so are especially 
inefficient instruments. Less-than-prohibitive export restrictions, like 
export bans, are less desirable than duties not only because they raise 
no government revenue (one of the objectives of intervention) but also 
because they isolate the domestic market from changes in world prices. 
The only case where duties may improve the country's potential economic 
welfare is when the foreign demand for a commodity is less than perfectly 
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elastic, in which case duty may improve the terms of trade. 
The price system enables the 'invisible hand' to guide the 
economic system towards the optimal mix of commodities produced and the 
use of optimal techniques in production together with the optimal 
distribution of resultant product in consumption, using the word optimal 
in its efficiency sense. The price mechanism acts as a co-ordinator 
between the decentralized decisions of producers and consumers and in 
doing so fulfills two objectives. One is the production objective 
whereby desired production is stimulated while unwanted production is 
impeded. The other is the allocative objective whereby prices tend to 
encourage the efficient division of resources in production and the 
rationing of goods among consumers. 
The achievement of these two objectives increases welfare gains 
to factors of production, individual countries and the world as a whole. 
Hence, if there is perfect competition, if social and private costs and 
returns are identical and there are no externalities, then it is Pareto optimal. 
However, if these conditions are not met, the above conclusion may not 
hold. In the case of the coconut industry, for example, the monopoly 
power which Sri Lanka has in d.c. and edible copra may mean that the 
optimal export duty on these goods is positive rather than zero. This 
and other possibilities are taken into account in the following suggestions 
as to what might be more efficient instruments to achieve the government 
objectives. 
5.2 More Efficient Intervention to Achieve Stated Objectives 
The government attempts to boost coconut production and productivity, 
protect domestic consumers, collect government revenue and reduce the price 
risk in oil through its intervention in the markets for coconut products. 
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5.2.1 The Production and Productivity Objective 
Intervention in the coconut growing industry to boost production 
and productivity would not be welfare-improving unless private and social 
costs of coconut production are different at the margin. The sub-optimal 
use of modern inputs and cultural practices and inadequate and biased 
research investment in the coconut growing industry appear to have led 
to divergencies between social and private cost. 
Figure 4.1 shows the effects of intervention in the presence of 
domestic divergencies. In this figure the volume of coconut produced 
is shown in the horizontal axis and its price in the vertical axis. The 
aggregate domestic demand curve for coconut is DD, the supply is SS and 
the foreign demand is EE. The production is OA of which OB is domestically 
consumed while BA is exported. Under the assumption of external economies, 
the marginal social cost (S'S') of coconut production is less than the 
private cost of production (SS). In this illustration it is also assumed 
that the domestic demand curve (DD) indicates not only the private, but 
also the social value at the margin of various quantities consumed. The 
price OE is determined in the international market and given. It is 
assumed that the exchange rate is in equilibrium, thus the price to 
indicate the private as well as social value of exports. The socially 
desirable level of production is OA', but due to the divergence between 
private and social cost, only OA is produced, hence the socially desirable 
production level could be achieved only by intervention. But the inter-
vention should not alter the existing socially desirable level of consumption 
OB. 
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a. Subsidies to Optimize Use of Modern Inputs. 
The return to fertilizer as an input in the coconut industry is 
well recognized (De Silva 1976). As a result in 1956, the government 
introduced a fertilizer price subsidy to encourage its use. As reported 
by De Silva and Perera (1976), during the period 1964-75, even v/ith a 50 
per cent price subsidy, the amount of fertilizer applied would have 
covered only 17 per cent of the total area if the recommended dosages had 
been used. There may be some economic justification for a subsidy to 
attract non users, but the optimal subsidy is unlikely to be as high as 
t?ie present 50 per cent level. In any case, if the failure is in the 
understanding of (especially small) farmers as to the optimal dosage, a 
better instrument (from both an efficiency and a distributional viewpoint) 
is to expand extension services, especially to small farmers, to provide 
tliem with information on optimal fertilizer dosages. 
The arguments for modern inx?uts can be directly duplicated for 
intervention to optimize the adoption of better cultural practices, re-
placement and more economic usage of lands planted to coconut. 
b. Increased Public Sector Research Investment. 
Technical change, achieved through research in agriculture is the 
single most imi^ortant variable in boosting the productivity in agriculture. 
As reported by Arndt and Rattan (1977), returns to investment in agricultural 
research have been two to three times higher than that of m£iny other social 
investments. 
Public investment in agricultural research is rational if divergencies 
exist between social and private cost in research or/and external economies 
from public research output. As evident from Table 2.6, the coconut growing 
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industry is dominated by small and subsistence farmers. Although large 
scale plantations have accounted for 27 per cent of the total area, the 
largest farm in this group was not more than 1,000 acres in extent. If 
the research in the coconut industry is to be financed by the organized 
plantation sector, the direction of research would be biased towards 
large plantations rather than small and subsistence farms. The apparent 
high cost and plantation sector bias in private research and very high 
likelihood of external economies justify public research investment in the 
coconut industry. 
In the Sri Lankan coconut industry, land is scarce while labour 
is the abundant and relatively inexpensive resource. If one accepts the 
Hayami and Rattan (1971) thesis, the new technology in the coconut industry 
should attempt to substitute labour for the scarce resource land. 
The w e l l publicised research results by the CRB refer to hybrids 
developed for the wet-zone areas of the island. Although the high yields 
from the new varieties are consistent with the land-saving objective, the 
purchased inputs and the level of management required for hybrids are 
biased more towards the organized plantations than small and subsistence 
farms. Barlow and Peries (1977) have highlighted similar biases in the 
generation of technology by the public sector Rubber Research Institutes. 
The plantation sector bias by the CRB in generating technology 
can be attributed to historical factors and to the greater demand by 
estates for research output. The Research Institute for the coconut 
industry was established by the colonial rulers to cater for the require-
ments of the plantation (export) sector, in which they had their main 
interest. Even after independence CRB has continued to fulfil the 
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objectives set by the colonial rulers with less attention devoted to the 
requirements of small farmers. The effective demand for new technology 
in coconut arise only from a part of its users, namely the educated, more 
politically-articulate and organized farmers with large scale plantations. 
The majority of potential beneficiaries of technology in the coconut 
growing industry, however, are small subsistence farmers who tend to be 
less educated, less politically-articulate and less organized as a pressure 
group. They are in a poorer position to create an effective demand for 
appropriate technology. This may well give rise to the plantation sector 
bias in the technology generated by CRB. 
By incorporating the technological requirements of the unrepresented 
groups in policy makers' guide lines to CRB, it is possible to correct any 
distorted demand for technology in the coconut growing industry. Thus, if 
an expansion in coconut research is desirable, then it may be that the 
highest payoff from such additional public investment would result if that 
research is directed more towards the needs of small farmers. 
c. A Price Subsidy Scheme. 
A price subsidy is the most efficient short-run measure (in a 
distributional view point) to boost coconut production and productivity, 
after achieving the optimal levels in public research investment and 
expanded small-farmer oriented extension service. It also enables 
partly offset the undesirable effects of export duties levied on coconut 
products. 
5.2.2 Government Revenue and Domestic Consumers Welfare 
a. Export Duties. 
The declining importance of export taxes as a source of government 
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revenue is perhaps attributable to the increasing ease of collection of 
revenue from other forms of taxes (Section 4.2). If the other forms of 
taxes can be collected at less cost than via trade taxes, leving of 
export taxes would be a sub optimal instrument for achieving this 
objective. But given that there are collection costs and they are 
specially low for export taxes compared with other taxes, a set of export 
taxes may well form part of a first—best tax package, even if it leads 
to production and consumption distortions. An export tax structure, with 
higher rates when the elasticity of demand for exports is low and lower 
rates when the elasticity is high, enables a given amount of revenue to 
be raised at minimum distortion cost. "If the elasticity of demand for 
export is less than unity, it will pay to restrict the quantity of exports, 
since export income will be raised while fewer resources are used for 
export production" (Corden 1974, p.158). This forms the basis for the 
terms of trade argument for export duties. Such duties in addition help 
to satisfy the objectives of raising government revenue and keeping down 
domestic consumer prices. 
Although it is possible for a 'price maker' to use its monopoly 
power to improve the terms of trade, that power is not unlimited. The 
optimal export duty concept^enables a country to optimize the extent to 
which it' can use the export duties to turn the terms of trade in its 
favour. This is illustrated graphically in Figure 5.1; DD is the export 
demand curve for the product which also represents the average export 
revenue curve; SS represents the domestic supply curve for export or the 
marginal cost of export supply and MM-, the marginal revenue curve. The 
free market equilibrium is at Z where the export volume is OA and price 
1 For a detailed exposition refer to Corden (1974), pp.158-200. 
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FIGURE 5.1 
OPTIMAL RATE OF EXPORT DUTY FOR A COMMODITY 
WHERE THE DEMAND AND SUPPLY ARE INELASTIC 
Price 
Quantity 
is OP. At Z marginal cost is equal to the average revenue and not to 
the marginal revenue, thus the free market equilibrium is sub-optimal. 
Hence it is in the country's interest to behave like a monopolist and 
restrict the export supply until marginal revenue is equal to marginal 
cost. This point is W where export volume is OA' and price OP^• This 
can also be attained through an export duty at the rate of P^P^/OP^. 
The optimal export duty concept is presented from another view 
point in Figure 5.2. This illustration, from Caves and Jones (1974, p.188) 
is used to represent the relationship between tariff impact on real national 
income and its impact on government revenue. This can be interpreted to 
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FIGURE 5.2 
EXPORT DUTY REVENUE AND REAL INCOME 
Real income 
D^ ity revenue 
I Rate of duty 
show the relationship between an export duty impact on real income. A 
zero duty of course yields no revenue. Duty rate t^is assumed to be 
prohibitive, so that a high rate of duty also yields no revenue. At the 
duty rate t^ export duty revenue is maximized, but this rate exceeds the 
national income maximizing duty rate t . The duty rate P P /OP in O A. ^ X. 
Figure 5.1 is equal to t^. 
The increased consumption stemming from a lowered domestic price 
due to an export duty was shown in Section 4.2. Thus levying export 
duties on d.c. and edible copra also helps achieve the consumer protection 
objective. It may therefore be advantageous to impose a duty at a rate 
above t (but not above t„) since this could not only expand government o 2 
revenue but also increase domestic consumer protection. Unfortunately, 
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it is not possible to say how high the duties ought to be until empirical 
estimates of export demand elasticities are available. It is unlikely, 
however, that the optimal rate is higher than the rates that have been 
applied in the recent past. 
b. Quantitative Restrictions 
The supply restriction or bans on exports may also improve the 
terms of trade and provide domestic consumer protection objective, but 
they do not raise government revenue. Hence they are inferior to export 
duties as a policy instrument for achieving Sri Lanka's objectives. 
5.2.3 Pot Holing Assistance as a Measure of Reducing Price Risk 
The so-called price stabilization scheme for coconut oil is a 
measure designed to reduce the risk of price slumps faced by coconut 
producers in general and especially the oil producers. It has yet to be 
operational because of the continuing improvement in coconut product 
prices since its inception in 1972. In the event of a price slump 'pot 
holing' assistance may be better than a price stabilization scheme in 
achieving the price risk reduction objective. Pot holing is resorted to, 
to support prices rarely or infrequently when abrupt and sharp price 
declines have adverse effects on production decisions and cause hardship 
to individual farmers. It is envisaged that if these low prices were to 
continue for some time, the industry would adjust to the new price regime 
(Industrial Assistance Commission, Draft Report on Wheat Stabilization, 
1977, p.50). The superiority of a 'pot holing' scheme over a price 
stabilization or even a floor price scheme is it neither interferes with 
the market mechanism nor becomes a constant burden to the treasury, unlike 
the latter scheme. 
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5. 3 Summary 
Ac a ijcncral rule, government intervention in the market reduces 
potential economic welfare. However, there may be some economic 
justification for subsidized extension information and expanded coconut 
research for small farmer conditions. Tlie apparent low foreign elasticity 
of tlem.uKl for d.c. and edible copra provide an opportunity for Sri Lanka 
to improve its terms of trade througli trade taxes. Moreover, export 
duties on d.c. and edible copra beyond the national income maximizing 
level may be woi thwliile, because tliis instrument also heljos to achieve the 
government revenue and domestic consumer protection objectives. Although 
quantitative export restrictions on d.c. and edible copra can improve the 
terms of trade and protect domestic consumers, they cannot raise government 
revenue and so are an inferior instrument to trade taxes. In an event 
of very low prices 'pot holing' assistance ai)pears superior to a price 
stabilization scheme. 
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CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSIONS 
The coconut cultivation and processing industries occupy a 
position of great importance in the economy of Sri Lanka. The coconut 
cultivation industry is dominated by subsistence farmers while the 
processing industries are purely commercial and export oriented. On the 
average about a third of the coconut produced is exported in the form of 
fresh nuts, copra, oil and d.c. and the balance is consumed domestically 
as food nuts and oil. 
Since independence in 1948, the government has attempted to: 
(i) increase coconut production by giving assistance to producers in the 
form of subsidies; (ii) make available adequate quantities of nuts and 
oil by export restrictions on kernel products; and (iii) earn government 
revenue through duties levied on coconut product exports. In this study 
an attempt is made to evaluate theoretically the effects of the policies 
designed to achieve these objectives and to suggest more rational inter-
vention policies. 
In this final chapter the conclusions of the study are presented, 
along with a discussion of the basic data required for further research. 
6.1 Summary of the Findings 
Empirical knowledge on the supply responsiveness of output and 
the marketed surplus of the coconut growing industry and demand and supply 
elasticities of coconuts and processed coconut products in the domestic 
and export markets is desirable for a study of the effects of market 
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intervention. The inadequacy of data for the Sri Lankan coconut industry, 
however, prevents empirical estimation of such parameters. Hence, 
economic theory and previous estimates have to be relied on to formulate 
a priori expectations of their signs and magnitudes. 
It is assumed that the output response and responsiveness of 
marketed surplus of the coconut growing industry is highly inelastic in 
the short run but not so in the long run. The supply of nuts, copra, oil 
and d.c. and the foreign demand for d.c. and edible copra is assumed to 
be less than perfectly elastic, v/hile the demand for oil and fresh nuts is 
assumed to be less than perfectly elastic in the domestic market but 
perfectly elastic in the export markets. 
The instruments of government intervention in the coconut industry 
considered in this study are grouped according to whether their direct 
effect is on domestic prices or quantities exported. 
In the Sri Lankan coconut industry market, the opportunities 
available to improve the terms of trade in d.c. and edible copra exports 
justify government intervention in these export markets. However, export 
duties are superior to quantitative restrictions due to the ability of the 
former to raise government revenue in addition to providing domestic 
consumer assistance. There may also be some justification for expanding 
extension services and public investment on coconut research. These policy 
measures enable the government to better realize its objective of boosting 
coconut production. In the event when export prices fall to very low 
levels 'pot holing' assistance has advantages over a price stabilization 
scheme as a risk reduction measure. 
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6.2- Basic Data Requirements and Areas for Further Research 
The basic data requirements necessary for the type of empirical 
analysis foreshadowed in Chapter 3 are as follows: (i) production data 
on coconuts, copra and oil; (ii) data on marketed surplus; (iii) domestic 
consumption of nuts and oil; (iv) producer prices of coconut products;and 
(v) annual acreage data on the coconut growing industry. 
The inability to estimate empirically the parameters of interest 
due to the data problems left no alternative other than to base the present 
study on a priori expectations. Better data would in future enable the 
empirical estimation of demand and supply elasticities, which would provide 
a better basis for formulating more effective types and levels of inter-
vention in the coconut industry. 
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